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A few years ago an article appeared in a West Coast newspaper that went
almost unnoticed in the legal literature.' It contained a brief, unelaborated
account of an inmate of a British institution who sought release following
successful brain surgery performed while he was still in prison. The operation
had corrected a condition in which a bone fragment exerted pressure on
certain portions of the inmate's brain, resulting in episodes of uncontrollable
rage. Following the operation, the prisoner claimed that he was not only freed
of his violent propensities, but that the operation had given him a new
personality and outlook on life. Arguing that he was in effect a new man
imprisoned in an old body, he demanded release from prison on the ground
that he had committed no crime.
Although the disposition of the British prisoner's appeal is not told, two
recent developments affecting the status of prison inmates suggest that his
1. L.A. Times, Apr. 6, 1970, § I, at 2, col. 4, noted in Shapiro, Legislating the Control of
Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies;47 S. CAL. L. REV. 237,
337 n.338 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Legislating Control].
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argument is one the legal system must begin to take seriously. The first,
discernible in the growing body of law relating to prisoners' rights, is the
increasing insistence of courts that limitations on the freedoms of the
incarcerated bear a legally sufficient relationship to recognized objectives of
confinement.I The second, identifiable in the technology of organic behavior
control, 3 involves the growing ability of biomedical researchers to identify
and change the organic substrates of certain forms of behavior that are
proscribed by the criminal law. 4 Newly developed surgical, chemical, and
2. See notes 146-201 and accompanying text infra. Despite the growth of nonincarcerative
alternatives, prison sentences remain the most frequent sanction for adult felons. H. KERPER & J.
KERPER, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 139 (1974).
3. "Organic"therapy, as used herein, refers to a set of procedures designed to modify
human behavior by altering the chemical or neurological bases of behavior, feeling, or mentation.
Organic approaches are contrasted with conventional types of therapy, such as counseling and
psychotherapy, which rely essentially on persuasion, insight, and exhortation. See Legislating
Control, supra note 1, at 244 n.8.
Those who are working to develop organic solutions to human problems do not discount the
powerful effect that societal, economic, and learned factors may have on individual behavior;
indeed, the organic model developed in Section I specifically provides for such inputs. Rather,
they feel that psychological and socioeconomic explanations of deviance only tell part of the
story. Seenote 106 and accompanying text infra. As organic treatments have been perfected, they
have found application in a number of conventional, i.e., nonorganic, treatment approaches. See
notes 51, 53 and accompanying text infra (use of brain stimulation in marijuana deconditioning
programs and biofeedback training). Classic conditioning has profited from the discovery of
reward and punishment centers in the brain. E.g., M. PINES, THE BRAIN CHANGERS 34-35 (1973);
see notes 48-53 and accompanying text infra. Even traditional psychoanalysis has been analyzed
in behavioral terms. E.g. Milan & McKee, BehaviorModification:Principles andApplications in
Corrections (Oct. 1973), reprinted in STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 93D CONG., 2D SESs., 495, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ANDTHE FEDERAL ROLE IN
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, 475-76 (Comm. Print 1974). See generally Schwitzgebel, Survey of
Psychophysiological Measurement Techniques, in PSYCHOTECHNOLOGY 43 (R.L. Schwitzgebel &
R.K. Schwitzgebel eds. 1973). For a description of the way in which use of automation
techniques and behavioral approaches have been used to increase the effectiveness of traditional
psychotherapeutic treatment, see Peck & Gathercole, Automation Techniques in Clinical
Psychology, in id. at 83. But see Schwitzgebel & Traugott, Initial Note on the Placebo Effect of
Machines, in id. at 141 (suggesting that any boosting effect may be attributable to suggestion).
Meditation, which has been introduced in prisons to reduce tensions and decrease incidence of
violent behavior, see Comment, Transcendental Meditation and the Criminal Justice System, 60
KY. L.J. 411 (1971), has also been analyzed in physiological terms. E.g., Wallace & Benson, The
Physiology of Meditation, Sci. Am., vol. 226, Feb. 1972, at 84; see National Comm'n for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Research Involving
Prisoners: Report and Recommendations (Draft, June 23, 1976), at 5 (summary of state prison
survey that included treatment of aggressive behavior with drugs), 5-6 (psychosurgery in prisons,
citing work of Mitford), 6 (prisoners' demands to be included in programs designed to modify
sexually aggressive behavior).
4. E.g., discussion of treatment modalities at notes 36-44 (electronic stimulation of the
brain), 67-90 (blood chemistry), 91-98 (premenstrual syndrome), 108-15 (fractional
psychosurgery) infra. See also J. DELGADO, PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE MIND: TOWARD A
PSYCHOCIVILIZED SOCIETY 220 (1969) (describing a recidivist thief who underwent frontal lobe
surgery in hopes of ridding himself of a compulsion to steal); M. PINES, supra note 3, at 205
(account of California prisoners who received amygdala operations designed to alleviate their
1977]
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electronic techniques permit modification of certain types of criminal
behavior by direct physical intervention into neural or physiological mecha-
nisms. Some of the techniques operate narrowly, excising particular propen-
sities or behavioral patterns;5 others produce more broadbased personality
changes.
6
For some time these movements have been converging. Their union-
which now appears imminent-raises novel questions for the theoretical
foundations of criminal punishment, as well as more immediate problems for
attorneys, judges, and correctional authorities concerned with sentencing and
release decisions. The solicitude that courts, legislatures, and legal commen-
tators have shown toward the institutionalized person's right of access to
treatment, 7 together with expansion of substantive prisoners' rights in other
violent propensities); J. MARK & F. ERVIN, VIOLENCE ANDTHE BRAIN 130 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as MARK & ERVIN] (results of a prison survey of epileptoid syndrome in violent inmates);
Breggin, Psychosurgery for the Control of Violence: A Critical Review, in NEURAL BASES OF
VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION 350, 351-52 (W. Fields & W. Sweet eds. 1975) [collection hereinafter
cited as BASES OF VIOLENCE] (discussing the use of psychosurgery to alleviate violence proneness
in adolescents with criminal records, small children who demonstrate intractable hostility, and
prison inmates); Philadelphia Daily News, Mar. 13, 1972, at 3, col. 3 (cingulotomy used in
Philadelphia hospital for control of drug addiction).
Because of the recent increase in crimes of violence and aggression, see, e.g., U.S. FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FORTHE UNITED STATES 4-7 (1972), and the
resulting concern about such crimes, see, e.g., STAFFREPORT, NATIONAL COMM'NONTHE CAUSES
AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, vols. 1-13 (1968-69) (thirteen volume
treatment of violence in the United States); see also Crabtree & Moyer, Human Agression: A
Bibliography (pt. I) (on file in Psychology Dep't library, Carnegie-Mellon University) (containing
titles of over 100 books and more than 1,000 articles in scholarly journals), it is not surprising that
organic treatment for aberrant behavior or criminality has, until now, centered largely on crimes
of violence and aggression, with drug addiction a distant second. Indeed, it is probably no
exaggeration to say that fear of intraspecific harm has today replaced fear of disease, starvation,
and other natural calamities in man's hierarchy of terrors.
5. E.g., notes 72-90 and accompanying text infra (drug treatment for sex-related
violence).
6. E.g., notes 103-32 and accompanying text infra (psychosurgery).
7. E.g., Knecht v. Gilman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (instituting procedures under
which inmates may consent to drug treatment); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2670-2680 (West Supp.
1976); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5325-5326 (West Supp. 1976) (setting forth conditions under
which prisoners and other institutionalized individuals may consent to organic therapy); Legislat-
ing Control, supra note 1, at 311-15, 324-36. The substantive right of access to treatment has been
derived from a nunmber of legal theories, including autonomy and freedom of mentation, e.g., id.
at 255-73, the eighth amendment, Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); but see
Sawyer v. Sigler, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1971), due process or equal protection, see Comment, A
Jam in the Revolving Door: A Prisoner's Right to Rehabilitation, 60 GEO. L.J. 225,233-43 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Right to Rehabilitation]; cf. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (by implication); see generally Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974), and on statutes,
especially those setting our objectives of particular penal programs, see Right to Rehabilitation,
supra at 236-37; National Comm'n for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Research Involving Prisoners: Report and Recommendations 9 (Draft,
June 23, 1976) (viewing it as settled that prison inmates may consent to or refuse medical
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contexts,8 suggests that these problems have legal, perhaps constitutional,
significance.
This Article begins with a brief overview of the current biological model
of aggressive behavior, 9 together with some of the principal treatment
modalities that have been developed pursuant to it.'" This review suggests
that several currently available techniques are capable of correcting the
violent propensities of certain offenders so that they no longer pose a
significant risk of harm to society. The second section reviews developments
in prison law that suggest that courts will hold organically treated individuals
to be entitled to release." Because decisions concerning incarceration
respond to a variety of societal interests, the right to release will necessarily be
a limited, rather than an absolute one. A third section explores the inner logic
and outer limits of such a right and outlines an approach for accommodating
the various interests into a coherent framework. 12 In the process of exploring
the modifications in sentencing and release theory necessitated by the
development of organic treatments, it will become apparent that certain
traditional conceptual approaches and assumptions become less useful when
criminal propensities become mutable at will. A final section discusses some
characteristics of ideal procedural machinery by which claims for release
based on organic rehabilitation could be heard. 13
I. THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF HUMAN AGGRESSION
A. THE BIOMEDICAL MODEL: AN OVERVIEW 14
The biomedical model posits the existence of several neural and endocrine
systems, each of which is innately organized and responsible for a particular
treatment). While the right of access to treatment received increasing recognition, there has been
a simultaneous increase in concern over freedom of choice and the problem of environmental and
institutional coercion. See note 132 infra.
8. See notes 138-227 and accompanying text infra.
9. Notes 14-35 and accompanying text infra.
10. Text accompanying notes 36-132 infra.
11. Text accompanying notes 144-227 infra.
12. Text accompanying notes 228-303 infra.
13. Text accompanying notes 304-40 infra.
14. The following account outlines a view of human aggression that is held, in one variant
or another, by most researchers who approach human violence from a medical or biological
perspective. The leading spokesmen for this view are K.E. Moyer, a theoretical physicist at
Carnegie-Mellon University, and J.M.R. Delgado, a neurophysiologist at Yale Medical School.
A number of their works are cited at notes 15, 17, 32 infra (Moyer), and notes 3 supra, 63 infra
(Delgado). The biological model does not purport to be the only theoretical basis for describing
and treating violent human behavior. There are also economic, sociological, theological,
ethological-evolutionist approaches, as well as classic learning theory. See Shapiro, Therapeutic
Justifications for Intervention into Mentation and Behavior, 13 DUQ. L. REv. 673,677-712 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Justifications] (extended discussion of the function of competing "models"
of human behavior); note 3 supra.
Its critics sometimes overlook the inclusiveness of the biological model; it expressly takes
1977]
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form of aggression. 15 These include the response of a mother to threats against
her young (maternal aggression), competition among males (intermale
aggression), the verbal irritability of a woman suffering premenstrual tension
(irritable aggression), and, in animals, driving an intruder away from its
territory (territorial aggression). 16 Together, these mechanisms enhance the
organism's ability to respond to life- or species-threatening situations,
thereby conferring evolutionary advantages on their possessors. 17
The probability that an individual's aggression system will become
active is a function of internal, environmental, 18 learned,1 9 and innate factors.
account of environmental and learned factors in explaining delinquent behavior. See text
accompanying notes 17-23 infra. It does not assume that every instance of deviant behavior stems
from an identifiable organic abnormality, nor that, when it does, organic treatment will always
prove effective. See, e.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 138-44 (describing the "either or"
fallacy); K.E. MOYER, A Preliminary Physiological Model of Aggressive Behavior, in THE
PHYSIOLOGY OF HOSTILITY 52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Aggressive Behavior] [collection
hereinafter cited as HOS'ILITY]; text accompanying note 117 infra (American psychosurgeons'
self-imposed limitations on psychosurgery). See generally E. VALENSTEIN, BRAIN CONTROL
(1973) (wide-ranging critique of psychosurgery by prominent physiologist). Its adherents do
assume that some pathological behavior is attributable to a pathological organism, and that,
ultimately, all human behavior is mediated by the brain. Seenotes 105-06, 111 and sources cited
infra. A corollary is that failure to take account of physical causes can result in impaired
autonomy, as well as personal tragedies, such as homicides, suicides, and wasted lives. See note
120 infra. For discussion of some of the limitations of organic treatment (especially risk-benefit
ratio, predictability, and certifiability of success), see note 133 and sources cited infra.
15. Aggressive Behavior, supra note 14, at 52; Moyer, Kinds of Aggression and Their
Physiological Basis, 2 COM. BEHAVIORAL BIOLOGY 65 (1968). The existence of a variety of
aggressive behaviors is similar to that found in connection with a number of other complex
behaviors, such as consumption. Animals engage in a variety of consummatory behaviors-
eating, drinking, searching for salt, etc.-and the physiological mechanisms responsible for these
activities have many features in common. But the chemical and neurological substrates involved
in initiating and carrying out these activities are not identical, and to assume a single common
mechanism would be fallacious. The same is true of the multiple forms of behavior that fall under
the general head "aggression" or "violence." See generally Moyer, A Physiological Model of
Aggression: Does It Have Different Implications?, in BASES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 161,
164-65 [hereinafter cited as Implications].
When applied to human beings, the term "aggression" is used herein as synonymous with
violence, i.e., a tendency to behave destructively toward others or their property. It is not
intended to denote the "aggressiveness" of an ambitious executive, nor assertiveness, hard
work, or motivation to succeed.
16. Implications, supra note 15, at 163-64. The tendency of individual aggression systems
to respond only to particular classes of stimuli means that they are "stimulus bound." A mother's
protective reaction will be elicited by the sight of a strange animal approaching her young, but not
by the appearance of a female rival of her species. Similarly, the aggressive response of a male
animal to the approach of another male of his species will not be the same as that aroused by the
sight of prey-although this may give rise to another type of aggressive behavior, namely
predation. See generally Aggressive Behavior, supra note 14, at 56.
17. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at I; K.E. MOYER, The Physiology of Affiliation and
Hostility, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 109, 111 [hereinafter cited as Affiliation and Hostility];
see K.E. MOYER, Internal Impulses to Aggression, in id. at 13-14.
18. E.g., Implications, supra note 15, at 179-80.
19. E.g., Bandura, Social Learning Theory of Aggression, in THE CONTROL OF AGORES.
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These include blood chemistry2°---particularly the action of certain hor-
mones 21-heredity, 22 and neurological makeup. 23 Thus, one individual may
react to a situation with rage because his blood sugar level has fallen below a
critical point.24 Another individual may react irascibly toward a wide range of
stimuli because his nervous system has been sensitized by an excessive level
of stress hormones. 25 Other individuals may behave aggressively because of
functional brain disorders,26 or because they have learned that certain forms
of violent behavior bring rewards .27 Each of these factors interacts with the
others; the organism's propensity for violence at a given moment is the
product of all such factors. Thus, a mother may beat her child because she is
suffering from premenstrual hyper-irritability, has borderline hypoglycemia,
and has had inadequate training in the responsibilities of parenthood. Another
individual may respond with violent rage to a minor slight from another male.
On examination, it may appear that he has an abnormally high testosterone
SION: IMPLICATIONS FROM BASIC RESEARCH 201 (J. Knutson ed. 1973); Bandura, Ross & Ross,
Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models, 63 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 575 (1961); see L. ERON, L. WALDER & M. LEFKOWITZ, LEARNING OF AGGRESSION IN
CHILDREN (1971). See generally Sarason, Verbal Learning, Modeling and Juvenile Delinquency,
23 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 254 (1968).
20. See Krsiak & Steinberg, Psychopharmacological Aspects of Aggression: A Review of
the Literature and Some New Experiments, 13 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 243 (1969); Sheard,
Effect of Lithium on Human Aggression, 230 NATURE 113 (1971); Tinklenberg & Stillman, Drug
Use and Violence, in VIOLENCEANDTHE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE 327 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula &
F. Ochberg eds. 1970).
21. See K. DALTON, THE PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME (1964); Field & Williams, The Hor-
monal Treatment of Sexual Offenders, 10 MED., SCl. & L. 27 (1970); Hamburg, Recent Research
on Hormonal Factors Relevant to Human Aggressiveness, 23 INT'L SOC. ScI. J. 36 (1971); Money,
Use of an Androgen-Depleting Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offenders, 6 J. SEX
RESEARCH 165 (1970).
22. E.g., D. RoSENHAN, GENETIC THEORY AND ABNORMAL BEHAVIOR 236-37 (1970); Daven-
port, The Feebly Inhibited (pt. I), Violent Temper and Its Inheritance, 42 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 593 (1915); Hook, Behavioral Implications of the Human XYY Genotype, 179 SCIENCE
139 (1973); Note, The XYY Chromosome Defense, 57 GEo. L.J. 892, 894-901 (1969); Akel,
Medico-Legal Implications of the XYY and Klinefelter's XYY Syndromes with Particular
Reference to the 47 XYY Chromosomal Abnormality (1970) (unpublished LL.B. dissertation in
University of California Law Library, Berkeley).
23. E.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at4-5,146; Hitchcock, Ashcroft, Cairns& Murray,
Preoperative and Postoperative Assessment and Management of Psychosurgical Patients, in
PSYCHOSURGERY 164, 164-65 (E. Hitchcock, L. Laitinen & K. Vaernet eds. 1972) [collection
hereinafter cited as PSYCHOSURGERY].
24. Clapham, An Interesting Case of Hypoglycemia, 33 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 72 (1965);
Podolsky, The Chemistry of Murder, PAKISTAN MED. J., vol. 15, June 1964, at 9.
25. See Implications, supra note 15, at 169, 172 (citing Ulrich on pain stress, Davis & Scott
on hunger stress, Laties on sleep deprivation stress, and Azrin, Hutchinson & Hake on
deprivation of reinforcement).
26. See sources cited note 23 supra.
27. E.g., Affiliation and Hostility, supra note 17, at 109, 123; Implications, supra note 15,
at 188. Psychological explanations of human action are not necessarily incompatible with
scientific hypotheses concerning the neurophysiological bases of human thought and behavior.
Justifications, supra note 14, at 689 n.27.
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level as well as a high level of nervous irritability because of continual stress
at home and at work.
The propensity for violence may be described in terms of a range of
neural-endocrine conditions called thresholds. These can vary over time
from complete insensitivity to the complete arousal that occurs when neural
systems are firing even in the absence of the usual triggering stimuli.28 In the
inactive state, the organism will not respond to the presence of an intruder,
with aggressive or fighting behavior, even though this would be the normal
behavior of an adult of his species. 29 If administered neural or chemical
stimuli, however, the animal will attack the intruder and attempt to drive him
away.20 This latter behavior corresponds to an intermediate state of readiness
in which the neural systems have been sensitized but remain inactive unless
triggered by appropriate stimuli.3 1 In a more extreme case, the cells are
continually firing and the organism appears restless. In this condition it will
respond with attack behavior even to minimal sensory cues.
32
In human beings, this last condition appears to coincide with a subjective
state of intense irritability in which the victim feels hostile without being able
to explain why. 33 Often, internal homeostatic mechanisms will normalize the
underlying neurological or chemical imbalance without incident; but if during
the state of heightened irrationality, the individual is subjected to external
provocation or his condition is aggravated by deprivation of basic needs, the
probability of a violent outburst increases greatly. At some point, a com-
bination of internal predisposition and environmental provocation will
exceed the level at which the victim can exert meaningful control over his
behavior.34 These cases are significant, not because the individuals are legally




32. Id.; see MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 6-7. The neural systems of the brain consist of
networks of cells, or neurons. Those responsible for aggression are complex structures involving
many brain levels. In any system, a given neuron has a multiplicity of connections, but the
neurons in any system tend to fire as a unit. Implications, supra note 15, at 164-65. See E.
VALENSrEIN, supra note 14, for an excellent description of the brain's role in regulating violent
behavior.
33. Implications, supra note 15, at 171-72, 179, 183.
34. Although many physiologists and neurophysiologists are determinists, it is not neces-
sary to adopt this view of human action in order to accept the proposition that an individual with a
low tolerance level may be unable to control himself when bombarded with stimuli of the type
that tend to evoke a particular behavior. Nor, as noted below, is it necessary to declare such
persons legally insane, and hence blameless for their acts. The brain is organized hierarchically,
and a great many forms of behavior, even those resting on organic bases, including hostility, may
be brought under conscious control in varying degrees. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
But defects in the lower centers, such as the limbic system, see note 11l and accompanying text
infra, can give rise to so much spontaneous activity that the higher centers are for all practical
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insane-under most tests of criminal insanity they are not 35-but because
techniques now exist that permit the identification and modification of many
of the conditions that give rise to such behavior, thereby reducing the
probability that it will recur.
B. DETECTION AND TREATMENT OF ORGANICALLY BASED VIOLENCE
1. Electronic Stimulation of the Brain.
Electronic brain stimulation has been used to ameliorate behavioral disorders
by direct intervention designed to induce emotional tranquility, by interdict-
ing violent behavior, by reinforcing positive actions, and as an adjunct to
other treatment modalities. In each case, the method of administration is the
same-thin, insulated wires are implanted in the brain, allowing messages to
be sent and recordings to be made from areas deep inside the patient's brain.
36
As a means to normalize behavior, electronic stimulation has been used
successfully in medical centers around the world in the treatment of epilepsy
and other spastic disorders, intractable pain, and anxiety neuroses. 37 When
used to treat abnormal violence, the technique requires that the patient
periodically visit the laboratory for stimulation. The current induces a feeling
of relaxation and euphoria. The application of electrical current at periodic
purposes helpless. See, e.g., sources cited at notes 104-06 infra. The objective of organic
treatment is consistent with a concern for man's status as a free creature, since it aims at
increasing the scope for mediation by the conscious mechanisms of choice, at the same time
removing the tendency of the subject to behave in ways that he does not choose and which entail
strong social sanctions.
35. The M'Naghten (majority) test requires that at the time of commission of the act, the
individual be laboring under such defect of reason, from disease of the mind, that he did not know
the nature and quality of his act, or if he did, he did not realize it was wrong. M'Naghten's Case, 8
Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). Most individuals suffering organically-induced criminality would not
qualify under M'Naghten because the test emphasizes cognitive incapacity. Most of these
individuals know, in an abstract sense, that their actions are wrong; they merely cannot help what
they do. Moreover, organic disability per se, even if it can be shown to have caused the offending
behavior, does not entitle the perpetrator to an excuse under the insanity defense. Rather, the
organic defect must be shown to have induced a "disease of the mind," which in turn destroyed
cognitive capacity as required by M'Naghten. For an excellent discussion of the difficulties of
applying traditional tests of insanity so as to find a legal excuse for organically-induced criminal
behavior, see Wallach & Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 210, 237-90 (1971). See also People v. Tanner, 13 Cal. App. 3d 596, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 656 (1970); Dennis v. State, 13 Md. App. 564, 284 A.2d 256 (1971).
36. E.g., Olds, Pleasure Centers in the Brain, SCL AM., vol. 193, Oct. 1956, at 105. See
generally J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 82-86. Implantation is carried out under local anesthesia
through small holes drilled in the skull. Ordinarily several electrodes are implanted at one session.
The presence of the electrode causes no sensation, since the brain is devoid of pain and pressure
sensors. See id. at 88-89. The wires are relatively harmless, and have remained in place in some
cases for several years. Id. at 88. To conceal the outlet, patients may wear wigs when living or
traveling outside the laboratory. Id.
37. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 88.
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intervals serves as an emotional pacemaker, similar in effect to certain
psychoactive drugs used in the treatment of depressive disorders.38 In some
cases a series of stimulations will normalize the electrical anomaly so that
further violence does not occur. 39 Violent psychotics have been calmed
sufficiently to enable them to participate in more conventional forms of
treatment.n0 Other less seriously disturbed patients have reduced their violent
behavior to the point where they were able to lead normal lives outside the
institution.4'
In addition to its use in assisting patients to maintain emotional equilib-
rium, stimulation has been used to avert impending attacks of rage or
violence. 42 This application is possible only when the target behavior is
presaged by a warning sign, such as an abnormal EEG pattern or a subjective
feeling the patient recognizes as a sign of an impending attack. In the latter
case, patients can be given their own control units.4 3 Seizures involving
sudden rage have been prevented by a patient's pressing a button attached to a
sending device carried on his belt or in his pocket. 44 The recent development
of miniaturized electronic devices, called stimoceivers, 45 has increased the
38. See generally id. at 142-43, 181, 200-01 (early experiments); MARK& ERVIN, supra note
4, at 31, 96, 108; M. PINES, supra note 3, at 201-02. For an excellent discussion of the telemetry
involved, see Delgado, Mark, Sweet, Ervin, Weiss, Bach-Y-Rita & Hagiwara, Intracerebral
Radio Stimulation and Recording in Completely Free Patients, 147 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL
DISEASE 329 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Radio Stimulation in Free Patients].
39. See, e.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 129-30.
40. Id.; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 170 (citing work of Peterson), 175-76 (citing work
of Heath) (Valenstein himself remains skeptical of this technique).
41. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 129-30; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 175-76.
42. E.g., Brain Triggers for Violence, in MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 92. See also
sources cited notes 48-49 infra. The physical model provides that the behavior of an organism is a
complex summation of the action of many neural systems which continually interact. K.E.
MOYER, Brain Research Must Contribute to World Peace, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 5-6;
Implications, supra note 15, at 168-69. Activation of certain systems tends to facilitate violent
behavior, whiie activation of others tends to inhibit it. States which increase the likelihood of
violence include hunger, sleep deprivation, and removal of reinforcement. Relaxation and
pleasure, occurring naturally or as the result of stimulating certain regions of the brain, tend to
reduce the probability of violent behavior. E.g., id. at 169-85. Activation of the systems
responsible for various types of affiliative behaviors, such as nurturance, love, possibly sex, and,
in animals, mutual grooming, also seem to reduce the probability that an organism will react
irascibly. See generally Affiliation and Hostility, supra note 17, at 109, 112-13.
43. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 176; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 182; Hendin,
Pacemakers for the Brain, SAT. REV. (World), Jan. 26, 1974, at 66.
44. Interview with Kenneth Moyer, in Tucson, Arizona (March 1975); cf. J. DELOADO,
supra note 4, at 176 (electrical self-stimulation to help suppress developing aggressive moods).
45. Pioneered by the space program, these devices permit wireless communication bet-
ween astronauts or other human subjects and a central monitoring station. In brain research,
stimoceivers are used to record or stimulate brain activity from a distance and to observe
interactions between stimulation and responses to certain environmental cues. E.g., MARK &
ERVIN, supra note 4, at 97-108. Initial application of electronic behavior control technology to
animals resulted in some bizarre experiments. In one demonstration, Delgado, having previously
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practicability of these treatment methods. These devices permit instantaneous
radio transmission to and from the brains of subjects, whose movements are
no longer limited by trailing wires. While subjects remain within the range of
the transmitter, simultaneous stimulation and recording of electrical activity
of their brains may be carried out. 6 Computers have also been used to permit
remote monitoring of brain activities, making unnecessary the intervention of
a human monitor.
47
In addition to its use in directly treating the physical substrates of certain
forms of human behavior, electronic stimulation has been used to facilitate
more conventional forms of treatment, including behavior conditioning.
Animal studies have shown that stimulation of the pleasure centers is a highly
potent reinforcer.48 To obtain pleasurable brain stimulation, laboratory ani-
mals will learn complex mazes and remember them perfectly for long periods
of time. 49 They will cross electrified grids to reach a lever that will send a
pleasurable surge of electricity to certain sites in their limbic systems.
50
Since other forms of reward are equally effective and less costly to
administer, the use of electronic stimulation in conditioning programs with
human beings has been limited. Stimulation has been employed on a small
scale in marijuana deconditioning programs51 and in the treatment of sleep
implanted an electrode in the brain of a fighting bull, entered the ring with the bull. Equipped only
with a small sending unit, he was able to "tame" the beast in mid-charge. J. DELGADO, supra note
4, at 166-68, 170-71; M. PINES, supra note 3, at 39-40; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 98. In
another experiment, the investigators succeeded in manipulating the dominance hierarchy in a
colony of monkeys by stimulating the brains of dominant males. Under stimulation these
monkeys altered their facial expression and ceased threatening gestures toward smaller mon-
keys. The subordinate animals gradually lost their fear of them. Later, a trigger was installed in
the cage. The monkeys low in the hierarchy learned to press the trigger, thereby controlling the
actions of their former masters. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 165-66; see Radio Signals
Trigger-off Mixed Emotions, MED. WORLD NEWS, June 11, 1965, at 32. This change occurred
without the dominant males becoming stuporous or suffering motor disability. They continued to
engage in everyday activities, such as grooming, eating, and climbing; they simply did so without.
asserting dominance. See J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 159-68.
46. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 92-95; Chorover, The Pacification of the Brain, PSYCH.
TODAY, vol. 7, May 1974, at 63. Professor Jos6 Delgado is presently developing a miniature,
transistorized stimoceiver that can be imbedded under-the scalp. After a patient's hair grows
back, the device will be invisible to the naked eye. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 93-95; M. PINES,
supra note 3, at 43; Radio Stimulation in Free Patients, supra note 38, at 338.
47. See J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 92-93 (animal studies); M. PINES, supra note 3, at 43,
53-54 (current research).
48. See, e.g., J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 140-42; M. PINES, supra note 3, at 46-47; E.
VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 66-67.
49. M. PINES, supra note 3, at 46-47.
50. Id. Stimulation has been used in animal learning studies for over a decade, and today
thousands of laboratory animals wear electrodes that permit the administration of a highly
reinforcing stimulus upon performance of target behaviors. Id. at 48-49.
51. Comment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health: A Right To Be Free From
Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L. REv. 301, 307 (1974).
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disorders.5 2 There are also reports of its experimental use in biofeedback
studies in which the subjects receive reinforcement for producing a desired
physiological response.
53
Schwitzgebel and others have suggested that telemetric devices might be
utilized with parolees to permit their early return to society. 54 The activities,
movements, and brain waves of these persons could be monitored automati-
cally by computers housed in central locations. 55 The computers could be
programmed to supply a reinforcing signal whenever the subject carries out
approved behavior, such as reporting to his probation officer or arriving on
time at work.5 6 They could also be programmed to send an aversive signal that
would inhibit undesirable behavior, such as drinking or violence. 57 The
proponents of such programs argue that rehabilitation of convicts proceeds
more rapidly outside the institution, 58 that freed individuals can make
restitution, support their families, and engage in other socially useful
activities impossible-in prison, 59 and that inmates prefer life outside the
52. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 143.
53. M. PINES, supra note 3, at 52. Brown, Awareness ofEEG-SubjectiveA civity Relation-
ships Detected Within a Closed Feedback System, in PSYCHOTECHNOLOGY 159 (R.L. Schwitzgebel
& R.K. Schwitzgebel eds. 1973) suggests that such an approach can help deviant or troubled
individuals gain control over their emotional states, enabling them to begin to act in socially
approved ways. Portable biofeedback devices are being developed which will enable an indi-
vidual to self-monitor a variety of his bodily functions. Prototypes of these instruments have
been successfully used in treating sex offenders. Letter from Richard Laws, Staff Psychologist,
Atascadero State Hospital, to U.C.L.A. Center for the Study and Reduction of Violence (March
29, 1973), reprinted in STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OFTHE SENATE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION 355 (Comm. Print 1974). See generally M. PINES, supra note 3, at 55-85. Because
the beneficial effects of biofeedback are normally not long-lasting, the most useful application
may well be as an adjunct to traditional psychotherapy. Id. at 80. When so used, the technique can
help consolidate gains made during the interaction with the therapist. Id.
54. E.g., Ingraham & Smith, The Use of Electronics in the Observation and Control of
Human Behavior and its Possible Use in Rehabilitation and Parole, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, VOI.
7, Fall 1972, at 35, 42-44; Schwitzgebel, Issues in the Use of an Electronic Rehabilitation System
with Chronic Recidivists, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 597 (1969).
55. Ingraham & Smith, The Use of Electronics in the Observation and Control of Human
Behavior and Its Possible Use in Rehabilitation and Parole, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, vol. 7, Fall
1972, at 35, 36-40; Schwitzgebel, Issues in the Use of an Electronic Rehabilitation System with
Chronic Recidivists, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 597 (1969). Telemetric devices are already being used
for medical purposes, monitoring many physical functions, including heartbeat, temperature,
blood pressure, EEG recordings, and the physical location of a subject. Ingraham & Smith, supra
at 36-40.
56. Schwitzgebel, Issues in the Use of an Electronic Rehabilitation System with Chronic
Recidivists, 3 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 597, 603 (1969).
57. Ingraham & Smith, The Use of Electronics in the Observation and Control of Human
Behavior and Its Possible Use in Rehabilitation and Parole, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, vol. 7, Fall
1972, at 35, 40-42.
58. Id. at 42.
59. Id. at 43.
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institution over continued confinement, even with the constraints of the
stimoceiver. 60 Although strongly urged by some, it appears that no such
program has actually been carried out.
Electronic brain stimulation has also been used as a diagnostic tool in
other treatment modalities. Even though surface EEG's and psychological
inventories can expose many organic abnormalities, other types of deep-
seated brain pathology frequently cannot be detected by these methods.61 In
such cases, electronic recording and stimulation may be the only means by
which hidden abnormalities can be identified. 6 Electrodes may be implanted
in regions of suspected damage. If recordings reveal abnormal patterns of
electrical activity, the regions can then be stimulated electrically.63 If stimula-
tion of the area produces a recurrence of the abnormal behavior, drug
treatment or surgery can be carried out.'
Professor Jos6 Delgado has described the classic case of a 20-year-old
woman with a history of encephalitis. 65 Suffering attacks of temporal lobe
epilepsy for 10 years, the young woman had on several occasions attacked
persons nearby. During one seizure she plunged a pair of scissors into her
nurse's chest, narrowly missing the heart. Between seizures the woman
behaved normally; total confinement seemed inappropriate. Electrodes were
implanted and a stimoceiver installed. It was found that the monitored regions
of the woman's brain displayed unusual electrical activity during her spells of
confusion and aimlessness and that electrical stimulation of the region
produced sudden rage. After surgery in this region, her outbursts were milder
and less frequent.
66
2. Chemical and Pharmacological Treatment of Organically Induced
Violence.
As with appetite and eating, which are triggered by changes in the levels of
glucose and other substances in the bloodstream, several types of aggression
have been found to be associated with variations in blood chemistry.
67
60. Id. But cf. Shapiro, The Uses of Behavior Control Technologies: A Response, ISSUES IN
CRIMINOLOGY, vol. 7, Fall 1972, at 55 (raising questions about the proposed use of telemetric
devices in connection with parolees).
61. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OFTHE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION
210-11,213 (Comm. Print 1974) (statement of Dr. William H. Sweet, Chief of Mass. Gen. Hosp.,
and Professor of Surgery, Harv. Med. School).
62. Id.; see J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 132-33, 197-99; Radio Stimulation in Free
Patients, supra note 38, at 336, 337-38.
63. Radio Stimulation in Free Patients, supra note 38, at 336-37.
64. See id.
65. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 136-39.
66. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 97-108.
67. See sources cited note 21 supra.
1977]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.50:215
Intermale aggression is associated with changes in testosterone levels;68
irritable aggression in some females with hormonal fluctuations of the
menstrual cycle. 69 Frustration and stress are known to sensitize the neural
mechanisms for aggression, probably as a result of the action of hormones
secreted during stress.70 Hypoglycemia, another blood chemistry disorder, is
known to increase neural sensitivity. 71 Certain neurotransmitters appear to be
implicated in overresponsiveness of the aggression circuits. These neuro-
transmitters may be susceptible to "fine tuning" by chemical means.
72
Such physical changes can sometimes be counteracted by chemical and
pharmacological treatment. Working by direct brain action, antiaggressive
drugs, such as chlordiazepam, dilantin, and chlordiazepoxide, are helpful
agents in treating pathological violence because of their narrow action and
because, unlike surgery, they permit functional blocking of brain areas, i.e.,
without destroying neural tissue. 73 Such drugs could be implanted underneath
the skin for time release.74 Professor Delgado is currently perfecting a
dialytrode, a device that will combine the functions of an electrode and
chemical cannula, permitting the physician to send either electricity or
chemicals to any part of the brain.75
Tranquilizers, stimulants, and other psychoactive drugs have also been
used in treating violence, although none is yet available that eliminates
aggression directly rather than as a side effect. 76 Administration is complex,
since effects and dosage levels vary from individual to individual, and
prolonged use can have highly deleterious side effects. 77 Potent psychedelic
68. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
69. Loyd & Weiss, Hormones and Aggression, in BASES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 92,
118. See generally Wallach & Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome and CriminalResponsibility, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 210 (1971).
70. E.g., Implications, supra note 15, at 172. See also K.E. MOYER, Internal Impulses to
Aggression, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 20. Population density has been shown to affect the
pituitary-adrenal axis, producing irritability. K.E. MOYER, Kinds of Aggression and Their
Physiological Bases, in id. at 46.
71. See note 24 supra.
72. E.g., Eichelman & Thoa, The Aggressive Monoamines, 6 BIOLOGICAL PSYCH. 143,
158-59 (1973); Eidelberg, Neurophysiological Changes Induced by Psychoactive Drugs, in BASES
OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 88-89;Reis, Central Neurotransmitters in AggressiveBehavior, in
id. at 57, 59-78. Many psychoactive drugs now in existence appear to achieve their effect by
modifying the action of neurotransmitters. 0. RAY, DRUGS, SOCIETY & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 39
(1972).
73. E.g., Monroe, Drugs in the Management of Episodic BehavioralDisorders, in BASESOF
VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 328, 338-39; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 114-15.
74. M. PINES, supra note 3, at 203.
75. Id. at 44; E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 171.
76. E.g., K.E. MOYER, The Physiology of Aggression and the Implicationsfor Aggression
Control, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, 81, 101-05 [hereinafter cited as Aggression Control];
Chorover, Big Brother and Psychotechnology, PSYCH. TODAY, vol. 6, Oct. 1973, at 43, 52.
77. PINES, supra note 3, at 99-113; sources cited note 76 supra.
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drugs, such as LSD, have been used experimentally to enhance the effective-
ness of conventional therapy.
78
Some of the more dramatic developments in understanding and treating
organically based violence have come in the area of hormonal action. It is now
established that the neural systems responsible for several types of aggression
are activated by the hormones involved in stress, lactation, and sexuality.
Both human and animal studies show that intermale aggression is highly
dependent on testosterone level. 79 In experimental animals, castration
immediately reduces intermale aggression. When the castrated animals are
given testosterone, they resume fighting. 80 In humans, elevated levels of this
hormone have been implicated in crimes of sex-related violence. 81 American
combat troops in Vietnam showed abnormal levels of this hormone in their
bloodstream. When they left the front lines, their hormone levels returned to
normal.8 2
Several methods of regulating hormone levels have been used to control
pathological male aggression. Some countries, such as Denmark, have used
castration to control violent sex criminals.8 3 More recent work has centered
around the use of chemical agents-cyproterone acetate, norprogesterone,
and chlormadinone acetate-to lower testosterone levels.8 4 Other studies
have attempted to control male aggressiveness by administering female
hormones,85 an approach used successfully in treating abnormal sexual
78. E.g., M. PINES, supra note 3, at 86-97. LSD appears to work on the more primitive
centers of the brain, such as the pineal gland and certain limbic structures, including the
hippocampus. Id. at 96.
79. See Conner, Levine, Wertheim & Cummer, Hormonal Determinants of Aggressive
Behavior, 159 ANNAL.S N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 760 (1969); note 21 and accompanying text supra. Recent
studies suggest that delinquency in females can sometimes be traced to treatment of the mother
with a virilizing hormone while the female fetus is developing. Seattle Times, June 28, 1976, § D,
at 1, col. I (studies by Drs. John Money and Jerome Goodman). See also Clayton, Kogura &
Kraemer, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain: Effects of Testosterone on Brain RNA Metabolism
in Newborn Female Rats, 226 NATURE 810 (1970).
80. Implications, supra note 15, at 171.
81. See sources cited note 21 supra. Studies suggest that the irascibility induced by an
excessive level of androgens can become chronic unless treated. Lunde & Hamburg, Techniques
for Assessing the Effects of Sex Hormones on Affect, Arousal, and Aggression in Humans, 28
RECENT PROGRESS HORMONE RESEARCH 627, 659 (1972).
82. See Rose, Androgen Excretion in Stress, in THE PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF
STRESS 117, 136-39 (P. Bourne ed. 1969).
83. See, e.g., Le Maire, Danish Experience Regarding the Castration of Sexual Offenders,
47 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 294 (1956); Hawke, Castration and Sex Crimes, 55 AM. J. MENTAL
DEFICIENCIES 220 (1950) (describing American cases and recommending the operation only for
"vicious homosexuals"). See also sources cited note 21 supra.
84. E.g., Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 97; Power, Subnormality and Crime (pt. 2),
9 MED., Sci. & L. 162, 164 (1969).
85. For a summary of some of this work, see Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 97. For
additional clinical descriptions, see Chatz, Management of Male Adolescent Sex Offenders, 2
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preoccupation.86 In a prison program for sex offenders, Dr. John Money, a
Johns Hopkins researcher, employs the drug, Depro-Provera, which inhibits
the sex drive. While under the influence of the drug, the inmates receive
intensive psychological counseling. 87 The program has been so successful
that recently a prisoner serving a dozen life prison terms for rape and having
no hope of achieving early parole fought a prolonged battle with the Maryland
penal system to participate in the program.
88
In assessing the success of drug treatment, some experimenters, in
addition to noting changes in directly observable phenomena, such as
hormonal level, have attempted to gauge changes in a patient's subjective
responses. Borrowing from the technology of behavior conditioning,89 the
physician shows the patient a series of slides depicting sexual stimuli. As the
patient watches, an apparatus monitors his blood flow for changes indicative
of sexual response. According to a leading physiologist, when these sex-
related fluctuations settle within a normal range, and if the absolute blood
reading is also normal, the patient is "cured": he is no more likely than the
average individual to commit crimes of sex-related violence.
0
INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY 1 (1972); Field & Williams, The Hormonal Treatment of Sexual
Offenders, 10 MED., Sci. & L. 27 (1970); Hamburg, Effects of Progesterone on Behavior, in
ENDOCRINES AND THE CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM 251 (R. Levine ed. 1966).
86. See Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 97-98 (describing work of G.W. Dunn). See
also Dunn, Stilhestrol Induced Testicular Degeneration in Hypersexual Males, I J. CLINICAL
ENDOCRINOLOGY 613 (1941).
87. Money, Wieddeking, Walker, Migeon, Meyer & Borgaonka, 47XYYand46XYMales
with Antisocial and/or Sex-Offending Behavior: Antiandrogen Therapy Plus Counseling, I
PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 1 (1975).
88. Washington Post, Nov. 31, 1975, § B, at 3, col. 1. At the time this article was being
written, the inmate was under treatment, felt greatly improved, and looked forward to an
improved prison status, possibly work-release. Telephone interview with John H. West III,
counsel for plaintiff, in Baltimore, Md. (July 7, 1976) ("a new lease on life"); Interview with
Judge Frank A. Kaufman, U.S. District Court, Fourth Cir., (July 7, 1976). See also Dennis v.
State, 13 Md. App. 564, 284 A.2d 256 (1971) (psychiatrist offered chemical treatment to a sex
offender subsequently found not to meet test of criminal insanity, apparently in the hope that
treatment could be accepted in lieu of punishment).
89. E.g., E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 175-76; STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITU.
TIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 571, 575-77 (1974); see ScI. NEWS, vol. 11, Sept.
14, 1974, at 168.
90. Interview with Prof. K.E. Moyer, Dep't of Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon Univ., in
Tucson, Ariz. (Mar. 1975). In a subsequent letter to the author, Dr. Moyer clarified that his
willingness to describe such individuals as "cured" does not mean that he regards them as
incapable of violence; it is, rather, that such a possibility is rendered unlikely. See also Panel
Discussion, Neurological Symposium on Neural Bases of Violence and Aggression, in Houston,
Texas (Mar. 9-11, 1972), reprinted in NEURAL BASES OF VIOLENCE AND AGGRESSION 128, 132-33
(W. Field & W. Sweet eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion] (comments of Dr.
Dietrich Blumer, Assoc. Prof. of Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Med.) (view that
antiandrogen treatment is highly reliable).
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A second area in which hormone research has been successful in
alleviating organically based aggression is that of the "premenstrual syn-
drome"-the name Dr. Katharina Dalton has given a number of related
physical and psychological disorders associated with the hormonal fluctua-
tions of the menstrual cycle. 91 Once virtually ignored by physicians, or
minimized as simply a transient manifestation of female "weakness," the
syndrome is now known to include serious endocrinological disturbances
capable of producing marked psychological and neurological symptoms-
tension, irritability, lethargy or mania, alcoholic intolerance, vertigo,
epilepsy, and schizophrenia. 92 Reserved for serious disorders, the term does
not encompass the relatively minor, periodic discomforts experienced to
some degree by up to ninety percent of all women.
93
Criminal and psychiatric implications of the syndrome include increased
hospital admissions, suicide, depression, psychosis, neurosis, and crimes
against persons and property. 94 A recent study of aggressive behavior in a
North Carolina institution showed that an abnormally high proportion of
violent acts by female prisoners took place immediately before the onset of
menstruation. 95 Studies in boarding schools showed that during such times
female students were more frequent violators of school rules, and female aids,
more severe disciplinarians. 96 Often, mothers charged with child neglect or
abuse are found to have committed the offense during their own such
premenstrual period. 97
Once diagnosed, the disorder can generally be treated successfully. 98 In
mild cases, symptomatic treatment with tranquilizers, diuretics, and
analgesics may suffice. 99 In more severe cases, hormone therapy can regulate
the fluctuations of hormone production responsible for the behavioral and
91. K. DALTON, supra note 21. See also Dalton, Menstruation and Crime, 1961 BRIT. MED.
J. 1752; Dalton, Menstruation and Acute Psychiatric Illness, 1959 BRrr. MED. J. 148;Dalton, The
Influence of Menstruation on Health and Disease, 57 PROC. ROYAL SOC'Y MED. 262 (1964).
92. K. DALTON, supra note 21, at 10-14; Dalton, Menstruation and Acute Psychiatric
Illness, 1959 BRIT. MED. J. 148, 148-49.
93. See Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 81, 99.
94. K. DALTON, supra note 21 at 80; Dalton, Menstruation and Crime, 1961 BRrr. MED. J.
1752; Ellis & Austin, Menstruation andAggressiveBehaviorin a Correctional Centerfor Women,
62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 388 (1971); see Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 99.
95. llis & Austin, Menstruation and Aggressive Behavior in a Correctional Center for
Women, 62 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 388 (1971).
96. Dalton, Schoolgirls' Behavior and Menstruation, 1960 BRrr. MED. J. 1647.
97. K. DALTON, supra note 21, at 95.
98. Id. at 46-57; Rees, The Premenstrual Tension Syndrome and its Treatment, 1953 BRIT.
MED. J. 1014.
99. K. DALTON, supra note 21, at 47-48; Greenhill, The Treatment of Premenstrual Tension
by Electrolytes, 166 INT'L REc. MED. & GENERAL PRAC. CLINIcS 502 (1953).
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mood disturbances. 100 Where hypoglycemia is implicated, regulation of the
diet may bring relief. 101
3. Psychosurgery
According to the biomedical model, violent behavior may be rooted in a
variety of factors, including chemical or hormonal imbalance, dietary defi-
ciency, brain pathology, and environmental stress. 102 For purposes of treat-
ment, a corollary is that a tendency to react violently may generally be
dispelled by eliminating one or more of a subset of predisposing
conditions. 1
03
One type of predisposing factor, however, is considered by some
researchers to constitute an exception to this rule of cumulative causation.
Certain disorders of the neural tissues themselves may result in such intense
spontaneous activity in the circuits responsible for aggression that attempts to
treat the problem by reducing other possible contributing factors1°4 are
100. E.g., K. DALTON, supra note 21, at 50 (1964); Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 99;
Janowsky, Gorney & Kelley, "The Curse"--Vicissitudes and Variations of the Female Fertility
Cycle, 7 PSYCHOSOMATICS 242, 245-46 (1966).
101. See note 24 and accompanying text supra. In cases that do not respond to physical
treatment, psychotherapy can help the patient understand her condition and develop inner
controls. E.g. Rees, The Premenstrual Tension Syndrome and Its Treatment, 1953 BRIT. MED. J.
1014, 1015. In severe cases, in which confinement is necessary to avoid harm to others,
confinement can be limited to the period of time when the symptoms tend to appear. SeeWallach
& Rubin, The Premenstrual Syndrome & Criminal Responsibility, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 209,
297-303 (1971).
102. See notes 15-35 and accompanying text supra.
103. See generally Implications, supra note 15, at 168-70, 182-89.
104. E.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, 69, 125-31, 146-48; see Gobert, Psychosurgery,
Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REV. 155, 161
(1975). Brain scientists do not assert that nonphysiological forces are irrelevant. On the contrary,
they believe violence is generally instigated by environmental stimuli, i.e., it is "stimulus
bound." E.g. Aggressive Behavior, supra note 14, at 52,56; Implications, supra note 15, at 183.
Violence is often mediated by learning as well. E.g., id., at 174-80. Still, all behavior is mediated
by the brain, including violent behavior, and it cannot be assumed that everyone has a perfectly
healthy brain. E.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 5-6, 140-44. Several types of brain
abnormality tend to make individuals abnormally sensitive to environmental stimuli. E.g., K.E.
MOYER, Brain Research Must Contribute to World Peace, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 1,3-6;
seeJ. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 121-23. These persons do not attack blindly, without provoca-
tion; rather they take a harmless gesture or remark as threatening or offensive. MARK & ERVIN,
supra note 4, at 6-7; see Implications, supra note 15, at 171-72, 183-84. In cases of extreme
impairment, the spontaneous activity of the circuits can be so intense as to override even
well-established patterns of learned behavior. Aggressive Behavior, supra note 14, at 52, 72-75.
Individuals so affected cannot control their hostile outbursts by self-discipline any more than an
individual suffering from grand mal epilepsy can control his seizures. K.E.MOYER, Internal
Impulses to Aggression, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 11,21-22. Although such individuals may
behave normally between attacks, their behavior during periods of dyscontrol causes friends and
relatives to fear for their lives. Behavioral symptoms may include extreme outbursts of violent
rage, larceny, arson, violence without motivation, aggressive sex acts, mutilation of animals,
threats to stab or mutilate other persons, and inability to take criticism. Id. at 21-22.
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futile.' Some researchers, including many prominent students of human
violence, believe that there are substantial numbers of such persons whose
disordered neural pathways make them a hazard to themselves and others. 1
06
These individuals can sometimes be helped by placing small, accurately
located lesions, designed to interrupt the malfunctioning circuits, in selected
portions of the brain. 107
105. E.g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 69, 125-32, 14648; Mark, Sweet & Ervin, Deep
Temporal Lobe Stimulation and Destructive Lesions in Episodically Violent Temporal Lobe
Epileptics, in BASES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 379. See also Mark, Sweet & Ervin, The
Effect of Amygdalotomy on Violent Behavior in Patients with Temporal Lobe Epilepsy, in
PSYCHOSURGERY, supfa note 23, at 139 (cases of hidden or known temporal lobe epilepsy
described as one of the "most resistant" to nonsurgical treatment).
106. See note 125 and sources cited therein infra. These individuals do not include bank
robbers, muggers, or revolutionaries-persons who commit crime for other motives, such as
stealing for drugs or to bring down the present social order. In general, the focus is on the "hot"
criminals, not those committing crimes because of learned or environmental factors, or because
they believe their crimes to be means to accomplishing some valued end. The problem individuals
with whom these investigators are concerned are those demonstrating repeated episodes of
inability to control anger, hostility, and violence, and showing poor impulse control resulting in
senseless harm to others. E. g., MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 4-5, 14647; M. PINES, supra note
3, at 192; Hitchcock, Ashcroft, Cairns & Murray, Preoperative and Postoperative Assessment
and Management of PsychosurgicalPatients, in PSYCHOSURGERY, supra note 23, at 164, 164-65
(commenting on the poor impulse control of certain epileptic patients). Others take a more
moderate view, but still believe the need to pursue organic solutions is great, particularly since
aggression is a function of stress and population pressure, factors that modern life is rapidly
making endemic. E.g., Affiliation and Hostility, supra note 17, at 109, 126. Several have observed
that neglecting organic factors in favor of sociological or psychoanalytical solutions can easily'
lead to personal tragedies. For example, one researcher describes a physician who caused a
patient's death by failing to consider the possibility of brain pathology as a possible cause of a
patient's unpleasant behavior. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OFTHE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN BEHAVIOR
MODIFICATION 212 (Comm. Print 1974) (statement by Dr. William H. Sweet, Chief of Mass. Gen.
Hosp., and Prof. of Surgery, Harv. Med. School). Dr. Mark cites another study in which 18
mental patients were shown to have been suffering from undiagnosed limbic disease at the time of
their deaths. Mark, A Psychosurgeon's CaseforPsychosurgery, PSYCH. TODAY, vol. 4, Apr. 1974,
at 29, 84. Mark and Ervin cite another group of 150 persons who had presented themselves at their
clinic in hopes of receiving treatment. Many of these people had committed repeated acts of
violence against friends and family members. About half had either attempted suicide, or had
later succeeded, as a result of their despair over their own condition. Most had gone to doctors for
aid many times, but had been rejected as "incurable psychopaths." MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4,
at 5. Thus, as Jos6 Delgado points out, excessive concentration on psychological or sociological
explanations can have antihumanitarian results if it causes us to ignore one level of human
functioning. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 254-58. A thorough pursuit of organic factors, among
others, can enhance human freedom and self-determination. Id. See also Detre, Kupfer &Taub,
The Nosology of Violence, in BASES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 294; Ervin, Psychiatric Studies
of Aggressive Behavior in Penitentiary Inmates, in id., 318, 326-27.
107. For a sober critique of the science of psychosurgery, see E. VALENSTEIN, supra note
14. After several hundred pages devoted to a thorough canvassing of the clinical literature,
Professor Valenstein cautiously concludes:
In general there seems to be strong suggestive evidence (if not absolutely convincing)
that some patients may have been significantly helped by psychosurgery. . . . Over-
all, the evidence does not support the position taken by those extremists who, while
1977]
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.50:215
Lobotomy and lobectomy-surgical removal or severing of tissues in the
prefrontal lobes-are rarely performed today. Instead, neurosurgeons emp-
loy a more limited procedure known as "fractional surgery." Through small
holes drilled into the patient's skull, the surgeon inserts a dye permitting
location of the target structures with X-ray photography. The photographs are
then used to calibrate the stereotaxic instrument. t0 8 Transferred to the
patient's head, the instrument and micromanipulators t°9 are positioned and
electrodes inserted through openings in the skull. If the patient's response to
electric current passed through the electrodes indicates that the electrodes are
positioned correctly, a stronger current is sent through the wire to produce
small lesions or coagulations.
110
Using this technique, surgeons have studied the control of various forms
of disordered behavior by placing lesions in certain areas of the brain. 11 One
refusing to examine the record, charge that psychosurgery was generally used by
sadistic, self-seeking, or indifferent doctors. This is not to deny that there existed
much that could be criticized ....
Id. at 315. See also id. at 318-31 (critique of fractional surgery).
108. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 77.
109. J. DELGADO, supra note 4, at 82.
110. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 77.
11. Although the brain tends to respond as a whole to environmental stimuli, over the
course of evolution particular portions of the brain have taken on specialized functions. Gorney,
The New Biology and the Future of Man, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 273, 331 (1968); Mark,
Psychosurgery Versus Anti-Psychiatry, 54 B.U.L. REv. 217, 218 (1974). It is this partial speciali-
zation that results in the deficits that are observed following stroke or brain injury. It is this same
specialization that permits identification of neural structures making neurosurgery possible.
Brain scientists have been able to identify areas of the brain that are responsible for speech,
hearing, movements of the limbs, and many other forms of behavior and affect. E.g., Aggression
Control, supra note 76, at 107-08; see M. PINES, supra note 3, at 36-54. Among these areas is one,
located deep within the lower, more primitive portion of the brain, called the limbic brain. E.g.,
MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 14-16. Since violence is an aspect of self-preservation, the
structures that regulate it are found in the deeper, evolutionarily more primitive areas. In man,
the limbic system regulates functions of the brain stem, including fight-or-flight behavior. It is
believed that in earlier times, aggression served the purpose of seeing to dispersal of the species,
improving distribution of food, while various affiliative mechanisms saw to mating and rallying of
the group for mutual protection. E.g., Affiliation and Hostility, supra note 17, at 109, 11I.
Encompassing a variety of structures, including the amygdala, the hippocampus, cingulate gyrus,
septal nuclei, and hypothalamus, the limbic system functions as an intermediary between the
higher portions of the brain, which govern reason, thought, language, and sensation, and the
lower portions, which are responsible for "gut" behavior.
Currently, much attention centers on the amygdala, an almond-shaped structure located
behind the temple. See, e.g., Ervin, Mark & Stevens, Behavioral and Affective Responses to
Brain Stimulation in Man, in NEUROBIOLOGICALASPECTS OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 54 (. Zubin & C.
Shagass eds. 1969); Ervin, Sweet & Mark, Amygdala Function in Matt: The Problem of Violent
Behavior, 12 Acrvirs NERVOSA SUPERIOR 185 (1970); Heimberger, Whitlock & Kalsbeck,
Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for Epilepsy with Aggressive Behavior, 198 J.A.M.A. 165 (1966);
Narabayashi, Nagao, Saito, Yoshida & Nagahata, Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy for Behavior
Disorders, 9 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1 (1963). See generally, THE NEURO-BIOLOGY OF THE
AMYGDALA (t. Eleftherious ed. 1972). Surface EEG recordings show that electrical activity in
this region increases when an experimental subject perceives a danger or threat. Stimulating this
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surgeon has performed amygdala operations on ninety-eight mentally
retarded persons who suffered from uncontrollable violence. 112 Following the
operation, he reported that his patients were calmer, less aggressive, and had
longer attention spans. 113 Relatively few deficits or side effects were noted;
the patients' IQ scores had generally improved, 114 presumably because of an
increased ability to concentrate. A group in India has reported success with
amygdala operations on offenders, including arsonists. 115 Surgical teams in
region causes cats to bristle, spit, and display other signs of rage. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at
30. Stimulation of a neighboring region produces predatory behavior, such as slinking, pouncing
on moving objects, and stalking. Id. at 31. Removal of the amygdala and other portions of the
temporal lobes converts wild monkeys, which ordinarily cannot be handled safely without
gloves, into tame creatures that played and cuddled with the experimenters. Id. at 28. Similar
findings indicate the amygdala is involved in organizing at least three different types of
aggression in humans. Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 86.
Other areas are also implicated in aggression of various types. Irritable aggression appears
on stimulation of the ventromedial hypothalamus. E.g., K.E. MOYER, Kinds of Aggression and
their Physiological Bases, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at 40. Stimulation of this area sometimes
causes test animals to attack the experimenter or another animal. Id. at 40. Irritable aggression is
often observed in humans with tumors in the hypothalamic.region. Id. Another nearby structure,
the cingulum, is also implicated in irritable aggression. Id. at 41.
The limbic system, in part because of its location, is highly susceptible to damage through
trauma, oxygen deprivation, and viral infection. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 56-59. The
epidemic of viral encephalitis that followed World War I left in its wake hundreds of limbic-
injured children who displayed uncontrollable violent behavior. Rabies is another virus that
attacks the limbic system, causing episodic violence. Id. at 58.
Brain scientists agree that the limbic system is the principal mediator of violent behavior and
that limbic-impaired individual§ have reduced ability to cope with stress. Their impulse control is
poor, and a wide range of stimuli will elicit a disproportionately explosive response. Often, such
persons will not be deterred from behaving violently by the threat of future punishment. Mark
and Ervin have coined the term "dyscontrol syndrome" to describe such persons. See generally
id. at 125-32. Mark and Ervin estimate that more than 10 million Americans have obvious brain
damage; another 5 million have more subtle forms of impairment. Id. at 5. These groups, Mark
and Ervin believe, account for a large proportion of all acts of unexplained, senseless violence.
See K.E. MOYER, Brain Research Must Contribute to World Peace, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14,
at 1 ("There are wild men as there are wild cats, men who have so much spontaneous firing of the
aggressive circuits that they are a constant danger to all around them and to themselves .. ").
See also note 104 and accompanying text supra. For an attempt at classifying subtypes of the
"hyperresponsive syndrome," see Andy & Jurko, Hyperresponsive Syndrome, in PSYCHO-
SURGERY, supra note 23, at 117.
112. M. PINES, supra note 3, at 197.
113. Narabayashi, Stereotaxic Amygdalotomy, in THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF THE AMYGDALA
459, 472-73 (B. Eleftherious ed. 1972).
114. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 221-22. But see Anderson, Differences in the Course
of Learning as Measured by Various Memory Tasks After Amygdalotomy in Many, in
PSYCHOSURGERY, supra note 23, at 177. Although the overall IQ of patients may not drop
following amygdala operations, there may be qualitative differences in the way in which they
approach intellectual problems. These differences may be ominous: "[the patient] will make the
most of this gain in well-structured situations of a somewhat monotonous and simple character."
Id. at 182.
115. Balasubramanian, Kanaka & Ramamurthi, Surgical Treatment of Hyperkinetic and
Behavior Disorders, 54 INT'L SURGERY 18 (1970); Balasubramanian & Ramamurthi, Stereotaxic
Amygdalotomy in Behavior Disorders, 32 CONFINA NEUROLOGICA 367 (1970).
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Japan, Mexico, France, and Denmark have also employed amygdala opera-
tions to reduce violent behavior associated with neural disorders. 116
Although in the United States the requirement that there be a demonstra-
ble brain anomaly is generally more stringent, several surgical teams perform
amygdala operations for violent behavior. "17 One team at Indiana University
has performed twenty-five such operations on patients whose abnormal
violence is associated with epileptic-like seizures. They report elimination of
violent symptoms in seven patients and marked improvement in most of the
others. Some of the patients, who had been committed to a state institution,
were released after their operations." 8 Mark and Ervin, a team at Harvard
Medical School, also perform amygdalectomies on patients with violent
epileptoid behavior."f 9 After earlier criticism, these surgeons now operate
only on patients with demonstrable epilepsy and only when other methods,
including treatment with anticonvulsant drugs, have failed. Before surgery,
each case is screened by an independent review committee. 
120
Despite controls such as those instituted by Mark and Ervin, amygdalec-
tomy remains a controversial procedure. 121 Although the operation is usually
free from the drawbacks of older forms of psychosurgery, its side effects can
be significant.' 2 2 Amygdalectomies frequently reduce creativity and spon-
taneity.' 23 Some patients deteriorate markedly; one patient committed a
116. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 86; M. PINES, supra note 3, at 197.
117. Although this type of procedure is most often used to treat intractable violence
associated with epilepsy, the operation is occasionally used to control impulsive or aggressive
behavior associated with other forms of mental illness. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, supra note 90,
at 39, 40 (bilateral localized lesions in lateral amygdala reported useful in cases of schizophrenic
aggressivity and homicidal sociopathy). Nevertheless, it seems the trend is to limit the operation
to cases involving epilepsy. E.g., Mark, Sweet & Ervin, Deep Temporal Lobe Stimulation and
Destructive Lesions in Episodically Violent Temporal Lobe Epileptics, in BASES OF VIOLENCE,
supra note 4, at 379. For a study of the relationship of epilepsy, especially temporal lobe epilepsy,
to violence, see Geschwind, The Clinical Setting ofAggression in TemporalLobe Epilepsy, in id.
at 273.
118. MARK & ERVIN, supra note 4, at 85-86.
119. Mark, Ervin & Sweet, Deep Temporal Lobe Stimulation in Man, in THE NEUROatOL-
OGY OF THE AmYGDALA 485 (B. Eleftherious ed. 1972).
120. Id.; seePanel Discussion, supranote 90,at 196, 196-98 (comments of Dr. Frank Ervin).
121. A single, proposed amygdala operation on a Michigan mental inmate, for example,
resulted in heated public discussion and an injunction against amygdala operations on such
individuals within the state. Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental Health, Civil No. 73-19434-AW
Wayne County, Mich., Cir. Ct., July 10, 1973). The case generated a small avalanche of writing in
legal literature, including a symposium in a law review. Symposium: Psychosurgery, 54 B.U.L.
REV. 215 (1974). Unless extended by later holdings, Kaimowitz would not appear to apply to
other, safer psychosurgical procedures, e.g., cingulectomy, described in notes 128-31 and
accompanying text infra.
122. The absence of controlled studies of such effects is particularly notable. See E.
VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 294-336.
123. E.g., id. at 231; Gloor, Electrophysiological Studies of the Amygdala (Stimulation and
Recording): Their Possible Contribution to the Understanding of Neural Mechanisms of Aggres-
sion, in BASES OF VIOLENCE, supra note 4, at 1, 33-34.
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criminally violent act for the first time in his life. 124 Friends and family report
subtle but pervasive personality changes. Some spouses liken the experience
to having a stranger return in place of their husband or wife.125
In search of a less radical procedure, some researchers have sought
ways to limit the extent of tissue destruction during surgery. Heimberger
performs partial amygdalectomy, destroying only a minute portion of the
amygdala using cryosurgery. 126 Another American, Schwab, employs incre-
mental destruction over time in an attempt to reduce the amount of unneces-
sary destruction; over a period of weeks, target areas are stimulated-to
determine the precise area of abnormality-and selectively destroyed, per-
mitting fewer and smaller lesions and reduced side effects.127
Other surgeons bypass the amygdala, operating instead on other struc-
tures, such as the hypothalamus 128 or the cingula. 129 Early reports suggest that
while operations on the cingula are as effective as those on the amygdala, they
do not produce some of the side effects associated with amygdalectomies. 30
Lesions in other areas, including the hippocampus, the anterior thalamic
nuclei, the dorsomedial thalamus, and the lateral hypothalamus, have also
been shown to produce some reduction in hostility.13 1
Because these procedures are irreversible, intrusive, and dangerous,
they have been severely criticized, and many respected neurosurgeons refuse
124. See description of post-operation behavior of "Thomas R" in Chorover, The Pacifica-
tion of the Brain, PSYCH. TODAY, vol. 6, May 1974, at 55, 60-65. But see Panel Discussion, supra
note 90, at 39, 40 (comments of Dr. M. Hunter Brown) (arguing that amygdala operations on
severely disturbed patients are justified in light of the magnitude of the problem).
125. E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 310-11.
126. Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 92.
127. Id.
128. Sano, Sekino & Mayanagi, Results of Stimulation and Destruction of the Posterior
Hypothalamus in Cases with Violent, Aggressive, or Restless Behaviors, in PSYCHOSURGERY,
supra note 23, at 57, discussed in E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 233-38. Sano has used
hypothalamus surgery on a number of intractably violent patients, many of them epileptics, and
reports good results. The patients showed some initial loss of spontaneity, but they substantially
recovered the loss within weeks. Sano, supra at 66; Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 81,
90-91.
129. E.g., Broager & Olesen, Psychosurgery in Sixty-Three Cases of Open Cingulectomy and
Fourteen Cases of Bifrontal Prehypothalamic Cryolesion, in PSYCHOSURGERY, supra note 23, at
253; Mingrino & Schergna, StereotaxicAnteiorCingulotomy in the Treatment of Severe Behavior
Disorders, in id. at 258; see E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 318-21; Ballantine, Cassidy,
Flanagan & Morino, Sterotaxic Anterior Cingulotomy for Neuropsychiatric Illness and Intracta-
ble Pain, 26 J. NEUROSURGERY 488 (1967); Sano, Cingulectomy in the Treatment of Agitated
Mental Defectives, 6 BRAIN & NERVE 146 (1954); Comment, Kaimowitz v. Department of Mental
Health: A Right To Be Free From Experimental Psychosurgery?, 54 B.U.L. REV. 301,324,336-39
(1974).
130. E.g., Broager & Olesen, Psychosurgery in Sixty-Three Cases of Open Cingulectomy and
Fourteen Cases of Bifrontal Prehypothalamic Cryolesion, in PSYCHOSURGERY, supra note 23, at
253; see E. VALENSTEIN, supra note 14, at 318-20.
131. Aggression Control, supra note 76, at 81, 86-87.
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to perform them unless there is demonstrable brain pathology. Recent
legislation sharply curtails the use of psychosurgery on captive populations
and imposes strict standards of judicial scrutiny.132 Nevertheless, it seems
likely that such operations will continue as measures of last resort, when more
conventional forms of treatment have failed and the alternative is a lifetime of
confinement.
II. RELEASE DECISIONS AND THE ORGANICALLY
REHABILITATED OFFENDER
The foregoing review demonstrates that criminally violent behavior is being
treated successfully both within and without prison walls. 133 Since courts and
132. See note 7 supra. Because of the possibility of coercion in the prison environment, the
prisoner's consent to organic treatment should be subjected to careful scrutiny to ensure that he
understands the attendant risks and has not been unduly influenced by prison authorities or by
offers of preferential treatment. E.g., Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's
Right To Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REV. 155. 195 (1975); Legislating Control, supra
note 1, at 316-20; Wexler, Reflections on the Legal Regulation of Behavior Modification in
Institutional Settings, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 132 (1975). Shapiro suggests that proposed organic
treatment in prisons be permitted only after judicial approval ensuring that competent consent
has been given. In addition, courts should weigh each requested procedure in terms of several
variables, including effectiveness, relative intrusiveness, probability of side effects, and exist-
ence of less onerous alternative treatments. See Justifications, supra note 14, at 738-43. In the
case of the Maryland inmate, discussed in note 88 supra, Judge Kaufman held such a hearing,
concluding that the prisoner's consent had been freely given, that the procedure was medically
sound, and that treatment should proceed. Naturally, recognizing a right of access to medical
treatment does not guarantee that the state must supply treatment in every case, particularly if the
treatment requires the allocation of scarce orexpensive medical resorces. See Note, DueProcess
in the Allocation of Scarce Lifesaving MedicalResources, 84 YALE L.J. 1734 (1975). Most of the
treatments described in this Article do not fall into this category.
In holding hearings on prisoners' requests for organic treatment, courts should proceed
aware of the implications of the two types of error that are possible. Justifications, supra note 14,
at 725-33 (1975) (discussing these two types of error (Type I and Type II) and the need to
over-protect against the error of unconsented-to-treatment, even at the expense of occasionally
denying an inmate in a borderline case treatment he needs and desires). Ethicists have also joined
the debate about behavior control in prisons. E.g., Symposium: Behavior Control in Prisons,
HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, vol. 5, Feb. 1975, at 16 (offering varying views on the goals and
objectives of prison treatment, the problems of consent, and the proper role of psychiatric
expertise in the correctional process).
133. The "success" of a treatment, like its pretreatment correlate, "reliability," is, of
course, a relative term. Where offending behavior is traceable to a physical anomaly that can be
treated by one of the modalities described above, at a minimum it can be said that the probability
of a reduction of symptoms is higher than when conventional methods, such as psychotherapy,
are used alone. See note 3 supra. Some of the treatments can effect dramatic cures ("success"),
while others can bring about cures, but not with any degree of predictability ("reliability").
Compare, e.g., text accompanying notes 91-101 supra (premenstrual syndrome-high success/
high reliability), with text accompanying notes 92-132 supra (psychosurgery-occasional
success/low reliability). Still others occupy an intermediate position--close monitoring permits
fairly accurate posttreatment assessment of success. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 85-90
supra (antiandrogen treatment for sex-related violent offenses). Finally, each treatment varies in
its degree of risk and in the type and severity of its possible side effects. Compare, e.g., text
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legislatures have protected the right of institutionalized individuals to receive
rehabilitative treatment, the issue of the legal system's appropriate response
to the prisoner who has undergone therapy, believes it to have been successful
in alleviating his violent propensity, and seeks discharge on this basis, must
soon arise.
Since there is currently no direct authority regarding a right to release for
organically rehabilitated prisoners, it may be expected that courts will look to
related areas for analogies and general principles. Two such sources have
particular pertinence. First, there is the growing body of decisional law
dealing with the substantive rights of prisoners. 134 Second, there are the
writings of jurists and legal philosophers on the goals and purposes of
punishment. 135 These sources are interrelated; courts faced with claims for
relief by prisoners alleging violations of particular liberties have frequently
examined such claims in light of the classic aims of the criminal justice
system. 136 Although most of the decisions have concerned violations of
particular liberties, such as religious freedom, a few opinions have examined
the condition of incarceration itself. 
137
A. RELEASE DECISIONS: ANALOGIES TO OTHER SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
Since abandoning the attitude of extreme judicial deference that characterized
prison law holdings prior to 1950, courts have reviewed with varying
standards of strictness actions by penal authorities that had the effect of
curtailing certain basic freedoms of inmates. 138 Earlier, such review had been
accompanying notes 121-25 supra (psychosurgery), with text accompanying notes 76-77 supra
(drug treatment). The probability of success and the certifiability of the cure become legally
relevant at two stages of the analysis-during judicial review of consent and the decision to
proceed with treatment, see note 7 supra, and during the release proceeding, see notes 297, 318
and accompanying text infra.
It seems probable that the future will see a rapid expansion in our knowledge of the organic
correlates of human behavior and the ability to modify them. M. PINES, supra note 3, at 210-11;
K.E. MOYER, Brain Research Must Contribute to World Peace, in HOSTILITY, supra note 14, at
5-11 (likening our present knowledge to that of atomic scientists during the early 1940's).
134. See R. SINGER & W. STATSKY, RIGHTS OF THE IMPRISONED 581-773 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as SINGER & STATsKY]; text accompanying notes 153-212 infra.
135. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OFTHE CRIMINAL SANCTION 35-70 (1968). See also
CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT (R. Gerber & P. McAnany eds. 1972) [hereinafter cited as CONTEM-
PORARY PUNISHMENT]; text accompanying notes 228-303 infra.
136. See, e.g. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545, 550-51 (1st Cir. 1971); Brown v. Peyton,
437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014, 1024 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
137. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,573-76 (1975); Workman v. Common-
wealth, 429 S.W. 2d 374, 377-78 (Ky. 1968); State v. Ward, 57 N.J. 75, 82, 270 A.2d 1, 5 (1970).
138. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,498-99 (1973) (tracing the rise of judicial activism).
See generally Right to Rehabilitation, supra note 7, at 233-36; Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:
A Critique of Judicial Refusal To Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
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generally denied, either on the ground that courts lack expertise in matters of
prison administration, 39 or on the ground that such administration is an
*executive function, not a judicial one.
14°
More recently, however, courts have begun to exercise a limited, but
vigorous review of prison policy when such policy has encroached on
constitutional freedoms of inmates. 141 While acknowledging the necessary
curtailment of rights and privileges brought about by incarceration, the courts
have recognized that a prisoner retains "all the rights of an ordinary citizen
except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken by law."1 42 This
review has proceeded under a number of theories, including due process, 1
43
equal protection,'nn and the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 145 It
has also involved varying standards of stringency, ranging from extreme
rational-basis deference to strict scrutiny.146 Additional tests are also em-
139. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,404-05(1973); SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134,
at 581.
140. SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134, at 581.
141. The movement toward more stringent review has been encouraged by policy state-
ments of a number of national bodies. One prominent study group, for example, urged that
appellate review of sentences may be necessary to fulfill courts' obligations as arbiters of
constitutional disputes. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS, Standard 5.11, Commentary at 175-76 (1973) [hereinafter cited as STAN.
DARDS & GOALS]. See also ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES § 6.1 (Approved Draft 1968); SINGER & STATSKY,
supra note 134, at 455-95 (discussing rise of the movement toward review).
142. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443,445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
143. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715, 738 (1972) ("[Dlue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose forwhich the individual is committed."). Seegenerally Singer,
Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the Eighth Amendment, 39 U.
CINN. L. REV. 650 (1970).
144. E.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (W.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 494
F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109-11 (N.D. Cal. 1970); seeDwyer &
Botein, The Right to Rehabilitation for Prisoners-Judicial Reform of the Correctional Process,
20 N.Y.L.F. 273, 281-89 (1974).
145. E.g., Fowler v. North Carolina, 96 S Ct. 3212 (1976) (mem.); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); see Note, Aversion Therapy: Punishment As Treatment and
Treatment As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 880,925-46 (1976). Often eighth
amendment issues, especially those concerning excessiveness of punishment, are interwoven
with due process and equal protection analyses, making it difficult to determine the precise
ground relied on in the opinion. See H. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OFTHE CONVICTED
293-97 (1974).
146. E.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,407-14 (1974) (discussing standard of review
in first amendment cases); Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 108-59 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (access to
legal materials); cases cited notes 183-84 (relaxed standard of review in hair length cases), 185-89
(high standard of review in race discrimination cases) infra; seeMorales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp.
544, 550 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (equal protection case) (requiring a compelling state interest),
remanded, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974) (finding an adequate, legitimate state interest); SINGER &
STATSKY, supra note 132, at 601-02.
BEHAVIORAL CHANGE
ployed, depending upon the nature of the substantive right and the procedure
by which the claim is lodged.147 Regardless of the test used, however, one
condition seems to be invariant: limitations placed on fundamental liberties of
prisoners must be justified by their tendency to promote one or more of the
essential purposes of punishment, or must be essential to an important
institutional objective, such as discipline or security. 148 This rational-
relationship requirement serves a critical threshold function: a failure to
survive its scrutiny renders an application of a more specialized, and possibly
more controversial, analysis unnecessary. 149 The universality of the test, 150 as
well as its close relationship with the principal constitutional bases for
review,' 51 suggests that it will be applied by courts confronting challenges to
continued confinement by prisoners who have undergone organic
modification. 
52
1. First Amendment Challenges: Freedom of Expression
Carothers v. Follette,'53 a federal district court case, illustrates the close
relationship between means and ends that courts have required in first
amendment cases. Authorities at Green Haven State Prison in New York had
deprived an inmate of 60 days of "good time" because of a letter he had
written to his parents criticizing prison officials. The court held that this
action could be justified only if it were reasonably and necessarily related to
-147. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-16 (1974) (least restrictive alterna-
tive test); Wilkinson v. Skinner, 462 F.2d 670, 672-75 (2d Cir. 1972) (clear and present danger
test).
148. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); text accompanying notes 151-228 infra.
See also H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 267-69. For a discussion of the traditional rationales for
criminal punishment, see notes 228-303 and accompanying text infra.
149. Selection of the appropriate standard of review has not been an easy task for most
courts. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,406-14 (1974); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F.
Supp. 544, 550 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 494 F.2d 85 (7th Cir. 1974).
150. See notes 151-224 and accompanying text infra.
151. One test, for example, employed in first and eighth amendment analyses asks whether a
given punishment or restriction exceeds the level of severity necessary to accomplish penological
aims. See notes 153-76 and accompanying text infra. Equal protection and due process analyses
turn upon a showing of a rational (or necessary) relationship to a legitimate (or compelling) state
purpose of confinement. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419-21 (1973) (due
process); Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (E.D. Wis. 1972), remanded, 494 F.2d 85
(7th Cir. 1974) (equal protection).
152. It could be argued that since the freedom to move about is one of the rights lost when a
defendant receives a prison sentence, analogies to cases involving other liberties are inexact. A
number of considerations undermine the force of this argument, however. First, liberty is a
fundamental interest protected by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, both of which contain
ends-means tests of their own. See notes 151 supra, 217 infra. Second, the universality of the
rational-relationship test in prison law opinions, as well as its analytical simplicity, make it a likely
candidate for extension to other contexts, Finally, a "new man" is arguably able to assert that his
rights to move about have never been adjudicated since he is not the person who was convicted of
the crime. See notes 240-44, 280-85 and accompanying text infra.
153. 314 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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the advancement of a legitimate purpose of imprisonment, such as rehabilita-
tion or prison discipline. 15 4 The court rejected the argument that correspond-
ence with outsiders could interfere with an inmate's preparation for civilian
life; indeed, it felt the opposite was true. 155 Nor did the letters pose a sufficient
threat to prison safety to warrant disciplinary action. Although the court
conceded that the state could adopt regulations designed to prevent sending
escape plans or messages relating to illegal activities, 156 the prison had not
established that its interception of mail was narrowly designed to prevent such
activity, or that the inmate's letter violated any of fourteen enumerated
regulations the prison had established to control correspondence with outsid-
ers. 157 Since the letter posed no threat to security or to other legitimate
objectives of confinement, the court held the prison's disciplinary action
unconstitutional. 1
58
In Procunier v. Martinez, 159 another case involving mail censorship, the
United States Supreme Court employed a similar analysis. Since the rights of
free persons were implicated,'16 the Court invoked a strict standard of review.
After examining each possible legitimate state interest, it concluded that the
censorship employed did not promote these objectives by least onerous means
and held the regulation unconstitutional.161
The relationship of prison rules to penal objectives was also closely
analyzed in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick,62 in which an inmate challenged a rule of
the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole. that prohibited all
correspondence with the public press. Writing for the First Circuit, Judge
Coffin discussed each possible state interest at stake-security, deterrence,
retribution, protection of the public, and rehabilitation. 163 The rehabilitation
argument was found unconvincing since letterwriting is psychologically
rehabilitative and assists the inmate in learning to channel his criticism in
socially acceptable ways.'" The interest in prison security could not justify
the complete ban on letters to the news media since a partial ban on incoming
154. Id. at 1024.
155. Id. at 1025.
156. Id. at 1024.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1030.
159. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
160. Id. at 408-10. "Whatever the status of a prisoner's claim to uncensored correspondence
with an outsider, it is plain that the latter's interest is grounded in the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech." Id. at 408.
161. Id. at 416.
162. 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
163. Id. at 548-51.
164. Id. at 551.
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mail would insure that inflammatory letters to the editor were not circulated
within the prison community.
165
The relationship of the ban to retribution and deterrence, however, was
considered more complex. 166 Not only would any rule restricting the activities
of prisoners further deterrence, the court observed, 165 but it would at the same
time advance to some degree retribution-the notion that those convicted of
crime should suffer. 168 The issue was not whether these interests were
minimally furthered by the rule, but whether the use of a ban on all letters to
the press was essential to these purposes. 169 By having held that prisoners
retain certain rights, courts have implied that certain deprivations are inessen-
tial to the furtherance of either deterrence or retribution. 170 Since the state had
not demonstrated that the mail rule was essential to these purposes, the rule
violated the first amendment. 171
2. Other Liberties
Courts have also employed an interest, or rational-basis, analysis in
adjudicating violations of other freedoms.
a. Religious freedom: In Brown v. Peyton,172 the Fourth Circuit consi-
dered a claim by Black Muslim prisoners that they were denied access to
religious literature and refused permission to conduct prayer meetings. The
165. Id. at 548-50.
166. Id. at 550.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 551. ButseeJohnsonv. Rockefeller, 365 F. Supp. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (upholding
New York ban on the marriage of prisoners while in prison). Plaintiffs in Johnson had argued that
prohibiting marriage frustrates the penological goal of rehabilitation. The court agreed that this
might be so, "[b]ut it is not for us, whatever our personal views, to choose among the various
possible penological goals or to pass upon the wisdom of penal legislation aimed at deterrence or
even retribution." Id. at 380. Evidently, the court felt that so long as a restriction serves any
conceivable penological interest, the restriction is justified.
170. 451 F.2d at 547.
171. Id. First amendment protection possibly could be extended to release decisions.
Certainly, some of the interests involved are the same, principally the right to speak and
participate in society. If courts adopt this suggestion, the substance of first amendment cases, as
well as the reasoning by which they reach their result would be applicable to release claims by
new men. Cf. Legislating Control, supra note 1, at 255-61 (first amendment protects the right to
produce and express ideas); Right to Rehabilitation, supra note 7, at 237, 239-41 (1971) (raising
the possibility that courts might find a right to rehabilitation based on the first amendment). Since
the connection between personal liberty and the freedom of expression is a close one, it seems
intuitively plausible that continued incarceration should be made to comport with the same
standards as those applied in the censorship of mail, and that continued incarceration must
further one or more of the substantial governmental interests analyzed more fully below. No
court appears to have adopted this approach in a challenge to incarceration, however, and the
principal avenues for launching such challenges remain those discussed at notes 190-226 infra.
172. 437 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir. 1971).
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court held that they were entitled to a hearing to determine whether legitimate
state interests justified such a ban and, if so, whether the ban represented the
least onerous method of accomplishing the state's objective.' 73 The court
directed that the prisoners' claim must be weighed against the goals of
protection of the public, rehabilitation, retribution, internal discipline, and
reduction of administrative cost. 174 Other courts which have reviewed claims
of Black Muslims have arrived at differing results, particularly during times
of racial unrest. 175 Still, their approach has invariably been the same-an
examination of the necessity of the regulation in light of the prison's
legitimate objectives. Cases involving more conventional religions receive
similar treatment, although the interest analysis tends to be more cursory, and
the outcome more stereotyped. '
76
b. Access to the courts: In complaints by prisoners that prison officials
had denied them access to the courts, the interest analysis often focuses on
whether the limitation can be justified by administrative necessity or the
requirements of prison discipline. In Johnson v. Avery, 177 for example, a
regulation at Tennessee State Penitentiary denied prisoners the assistance of
jailhouse lawyers in preparing writs. In arriving at its holding that the
regulation was unjustifiable, 178 the United States Supreme Court weighed the
state's interest in administrative efficiency against the value of the writ in our
scheme of justice. 7 9 Another Supreme Court opinion, Procunier v. Mar-
tinez,180 involved a challenge to a prison rule that denied law students and
paralegal workers access to prisoners. The Court required that the rule be
shown necessary to the attainment of legitimate penal goals and that it be the
least onerous method of achieving such goals. 18' Since the state failed to make
such a showing, the lower court's decision invalidating the regulation was
upheld. 1
8 2
c. Hair length regulations: In challenges to hair length rules, courts have
typically sided with the prison administration, finding the regulations appro-
priate because they tend to promote personal cleanliness, an aspect of the
173. Id. at 1232.
174. Id. at 1231-32.
175. E.g., Jones v. Willingham, 248 F. Supp. 791 (D. Kan. 1965); Desmond v. Blackwell, 235
F. Supp. 246 (M.D. Pa. 1964)--(both upholding restrictions on Black Muslim gatherings).
176. E.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (upholding practice of Buddhism in Texas
prison); see CoQper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1966).
177. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
178. Id. at 490.
179. Id. at 485-90.
180. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
181. Id. at 420.
182. Id. at 421.
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prison's rehabilitative and custodial functions. 83 At least one court has
applied an intermediate level rational-basis test reminiscent of the earlier
"hands off" policy since the court felt that hair length regulations did not
implicate fundamental values.
18 4
d. Race discrimination: By contrast, courts entertaining challenges to
race discrimination have rarely upheld the discriminatory practice, even
though it might arguably have furthered state interests in prison security and
discipline. McClelland v. Siglert 85 involved a challenge to racially segre-
gated housing in two units of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex.
The court conceded it was "not unimpressed" with the argument that these
arrangements were needed to prevent interracial strife. 186 Nevertheless, the
segregation was held to violate the fourteenth amendment since the state's
interest in alleviating racial tensions was not great enough to override the
petitioners' interest in enjoying nondiscriminatory treatment. 187 Segregation
in Georgia prisons had received similar scrutiny, 188 although the opinion in
that case had suggested that the state's interest in security might justify
temporary segregation of inmates during outbursts of racial strife. 1
89
Like the first amendment cases already considered, these opinions give
additional support to the suggestion that courts will apply an interest, or
rational-relationship analysis to challenges by the "new man" that his
continued confinement is unjustifiable.
B. DIRECT ATTACKS ON INCARCERATION: APPELLATE REVIEW
In addition to demonstrating increased activism in connection with unneces-
sarily restrictive prison rules, courts have subjected certain aspects of
confinement itself to appellate review.
183. E.g., Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105 (S.D. Iowa 1973); cf. Bishop v. Colaw,450
F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). Bishop involved a substantially equivalent high school rule held not
justifiable by reference to safety and sanitation requirements since these objectives were capable
of being achieved by less restrictive rules such as requiring caps. The district court in Rinehart
refused to follow the Bishop court's lead, urging that the prison's needs for control over inmates
are higher than those of high school administrators over students. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F.
Supp. at 112.
184. Rinehart v. Brewer, 360 F. Supp. 105, 112 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
185. 327 F. Supp. 829 (D. Neb. 1971).
186. Id. at 833.
187. Id. at 834. In arriving at its holding, the court cited with approval an earlier Supreme
Court decision which had reviewed a district court's desegregation order directing an end to racial
segregation in Alabama prisons. Id. at 832, citing Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968). The
Supreme Court summarily upheld the decision below, finding the state's claim that insufficient
allowance had been made for its interest in prison security without merit. 327 F. Supp. at 334.
188. Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968).
189. Id. at 1009 n.5.
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Traditionally, appellate courts were reluctant to declare sentences exces-
sive because sentence length was considered a matter falling within the
province of the legislature and the sentencing judge. 190 Recently, however,
courts have begun to overturn sentence determinations in cases involving
egregious error or manifest unfairness.
1. Special Defendants
In State v. Ward,'9' the New Jersey Supreme Court suspended the 2- to 3-year
sentence of an 18-year-old youth convicted for possessing marijuana-his
first such offense-on the ground that the sentence was too harsh and thus an
abuse of the trial judge's discretion. Although the trial judge had imposed the
sentence pursuant to a statute permitting sentences of 2 to 15 years, the court
found the sentence to be against the public interest, since the youth, if
required to serve time, would likely emerge more dangerous to society and to
himself than if required to make amends outside of prison.193
In Workman v. Commonwealth,194 two 14-year-old boys had been
convicted of raping an elderly woman, and sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole. The Kentucky Court of Appeals held the parole
restriction unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, since juveniles are not
incorrigible; they retain the capacity to grow and mature. 195 The court
concluded that the parole restriction could not have been in accord with
legislative intent, for the statute was obviously aimed at dangerous incorrig-
ibles, not malleable youths.
196
In Watson v. United States,197 an adult narcotics addict had received a
mandatory 10-year sentence for selling drugs. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held that while such a sentence might be justified in
some cases, its imposition in cases of confirmed addicts abused discretion
since addicts are not fully responsible for their actions. 198
These cases illustrate three rationales under which organically recon-
structed prisoners could challenge confinement. Like the confinement of the
juvenile in Ward, continued incarceration of a new man serves little societal
190. SeeUnited States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583,603-11 (2d Cir. 1952); Stanford v. State,
110 So. 2d I (Fla. 1959); STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 141, at 142-43.
191. 57 N.J. 75, 270 A.2d 1 (1970).
192. Id. at 81, 270 A.2d at 4.
193. Id. at 82, 270 A.2d at5. See also State v. Brennan, 115 N.J. Super. 400,405-08,279 A.2d
900, 902-04 (1971).
194. 429 S.W. 2d 374 (Ky. 1968).
195. Id. at 378.
196. Id.
197. 37 U.S.L.W. 2352 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 1968).
198. Id.
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purpose 199 and risks exposing the inmate to harmful influences. 2° Like the
petitioner in Workman, the organically rehabilitated individual, by his
rehabilitation, has demonstrated his own malleability and potential for
growth.210 Arguably, his continued confinement is also inconsistent with
legislative intent, since sentencing statutes cannot reasonably be aimed at
persons who are neither in need of reformation nor dangerous to society.
20 2
Finally, as in Watson, reviewing courts might well be reluctant to impose
lengthy sentences on individuals whose offenses, while not rising to the level
of legal insanity, are expressions of organic pathology.20 3
2. Therapeutic Incarceration
Closely related to the principle of the Watson case is the tendency, in both
statutory and case law, to provide for review of the status of persons whose
original confinement was based on the need for treatment and who may have
since recovered. 204 Civil and criminal commitment statutes, 20 5 as well as
sexual psychopath statutes, 206 frequently provide for periodic review and
examination. Where such provisions are absent, courts have often imposed a
duty on the institution to utilize the least onerous form of treatment, including
release when appropriate.
207
The requirement of least onerous treatment was recently reinforced by
the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson.20 8 Donaldson, an inmate in a
199. See text accompanying notes 228-303 infra.
200. For an account of the shocking conditions that prevail in prisons today, see, e.g., Holt
v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); SINGER &
STATSKY, supra note 134, at 511-80, 751-74.
201. At least one commentator has expressed reservations at calling organically reformed
individuals "rehabilitated." See Legislating Control, supra note 1, at 296-307.
202. Protection of these interests has been urged by courts and commentators as among the
most central objectives of our system of criminal justice. See, e.g., notes 162-71 and accompany-
ing text supra, 228-303 and accompanying text infra.
203. See generally H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 50-51, 130-35.
204. For a lucid discussion of the movement toward therapeutic justice, see generally
SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134, at 13-268. For a discussion of indeterminate sentences and
their use for therapeutic and rehabilitative rather than punitive purposes, see Dershowitz,
Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Hann, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974).
205. Many jurisdictions provide for periodic examinations of involuntarily hospitalized
persons. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 21-546 (1967); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.239
(1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-10 (1954). See alsoNATIONAL INST. OF MENTALHEALTH, A DRAFT
ACT GOVERNING HOSPITALIZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL § 15 (1952).
206. E.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6327 (West Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
123A, § 9 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:164-8 (1971).
207. E.g., Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617,623-25 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lake v. Cameron, 364
F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 147, Standard 5.2;
Singer, Sending Men to Prison: Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof andtheDoctrine of
the Least Drastic Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 51
(1972).
208. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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mental institution for 15 years, had been committed upon allegations by his
father that he suffered delusions. At trial the jury found that Donaldson was
not dangerous to himself or to others, and that friends were willing to care for
him outside the institution.2°9 Holding that a person not dangerous to himself
or to others could not be constitutionally confined unless he received
rehabilitative treatment, the court had awarded Donaldson damages from his
incarcerators. The Supreme Court upheld the order, stating that "given the
jury's findings, [no rationale] was left . . . for keeping Donaldson in
confinement. "210 Since Donaldson was dangerous neither to himself nor to
others and had the prospect of shelter and care in the home of friends, the
original grounds for commitment were now dissipated: "even if his involun-
tary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally
continue after that basis no longer existed.' 211
The movement to require the least onerous alternative in therapeutic
confinement, state statutes requiring periodic review of the status of prison-
ers, and Donaldson all suggest that when confinement is imposed to effect
therapeutic ends, the attainment of these ends should result in release.
212
3. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
A more traditional basis for appellate attack on sentences-although one that
has been used sparingly-is the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment. In recent years, the amendment has been the basis of
successful challenges to indeterminate sentences, 213 the death penalty, 214 and
crimes of status. 215 Entire state prison systems have been held to violate the
eighth amendment because of substandard living conditions and inadequate
rehabilitative opportunities.
21 6
209. Id. at 568-69.
210. Id. at 574.
211. Id. at 575.
212. The criminal analog of therapeutic confinement provisions, indeterminate sentence
statutes, now exist in a majority of United States jurisdictions. Their purpose is to permit release
"at the earliest time within the limits fixed which [the inmate's] personal situation indicates." R.
CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 222 (1970). But see J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 81
(1973). Where such a'statute is in effect, a parole board's refusal to permit the discharge of an
organically rehabilita~d prisoner could be challenged as an abuse of discretion. Cf. cases cited
notes 191-97 supra (unnecessarily long sentences, even though within statutory limits, held abuse
of trial courts' discretion).
213. People v. Wingo, 14 Cal. 3d 169, 534 P.2d 1001, 121 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1975); In reLynch, 8
Cal. 3d 410, 503 P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1972); cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972)
(discussing petitioner's eighth amendment claim but deciding on grounds of equal protection and
due process). Contra, Carnley v. Cochran, 118 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 1960).
214. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
215. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 676 (1962); see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968).
216. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304(8th Cir. 1971);
Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971). Where the living
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Eighth amendment analysis includes three distinct tests: (1) an exces-
siveness test, prohibiting punishment not promoting penal goals; 217 (2) a
proportionality test, prohibiting punishment beyond proportion to the
crime; 218 and (3) an inherently-cruel-and-unusual test, prohibiting punish-
ment shockingly cruel. 219 Courts have held that both proportionality and
shocking cruelty must be interpreted in light of evolving standards of what
constitutes permissible punishment.220 In challenging the legality of con-
tinued confinement, new men may utilize variations of these tests. For
defendants who are young and malleable, or whose prospects for improve-
ment are otherwise good, long prison terms have been held inappropriate,
since long terms would exceed the degree of punishment necessary to achieve
reform. 221 As is discussed more fully in the next Section, 222 the new man
might similarly argue that his own capacity for reform had been proven, and
that further punishment would consequently be consititutionally
unjustifiable.
The excessiveness test examines the relationship between punishment
and penological goals. Though extended review of the objectives of the
criminal justice system and the extent to which classic rationales for punish-
ment remain viable after organic transformation must be deferred until the
next Section, 223 the earlier discussion of prison law cases224 should suggest
that curtailing the freedom of organically rehabilitated prisoners can pose
conceptual problems for traditional bases of punishment. If, as is suggested
later, organic treatment can at times undercut all possible bases of punish-
ment, then such punishment may well be vulnerable to eighth amendment
attack.
conditions have been egregious, courts have even threatened to order the prisoners released as a
remedy. Curley v. Gonzalez, Civ. No. 8372 (D.N.M. July 29, 1970) (jail complied with over-
crowding order by releasing all but 60 prisoners).
217. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Workman v.
Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968), Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679
(N.D. Cal. 1966).
218. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 370 (1910); In reLynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503
P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1973); see Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 1972);
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621,646 (E.D. Va. 1971); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
219. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). See generally Note, Aversion Therapy:
Punishment As Treatment and Treatment As Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 49 S. CAL. L. REv.
880, 925-46 (1976).
220. E.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 374, 378 (1910); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).
221. E.g., Jones v. State, 510 P.2d 1070, 1071 (Alas. 1973); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W.2d 374, 377 (Ky. 1968); State v. Keck, 187 Neb. 794, 795-96, 194 N.W.2d 186, 187 (1972);
State v. Brennan, 115 N.J. Super. 400, 406-08, 279 A.2d 900, 904 (1971).
222. Notes 265-69 and accompanying text infra.
223. Notes 235-303 and accompanying text infra.
224. Notes 148-89 and accompanying text supra.
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A fourth, more speculative grounds for judicial scrutiny is the eighth
amendment's prohibition of punishment based on status. Two Supreme Court
and a handful of other decisions225 establish that individuals may not be
punished solely because of their status-there must also be a criminal act.
Where technologically induced change has been so extensive as to suggest a
transformed identity, 226 the new man might well argue that he is being
punished for an act that is not his, and that his incarceration is thus based
solely on his status of being presently incarcerated.227
III. RELEASE DECISIONS AND THE JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT
As the above review suggests, means-end scrutiny figures prominently in
each of the tests courts are likely to use in reviewing release requests of
organically rehabilitated offenders. Where it can be shown that incarceration
advances recognized objectives of punishment, such incarceration will likely
be left undisturbed. But where it cannot be so demonstrated, incarceration
should prove vulnerable to constitutional attack.228
The goals of punishment have been categorized in various ways,
including utilitarian,229  behavioral,230  retributive, 231  and treatment-
225. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); e.g.,
Robison v. Miner & Haug, 68 Mich. 549, 37 N.W. 21 (1888).
226. Cf. text accompanying notes 240-44, 280-85 infra (continuity of identity depends on
purpose for which identity is required).
227. Problems of legal identity created by organic treatment are discussed again in Section
III in connection with the deterrent and retributive rationales of punishment.
228. The emphasis in Sections II and III on the constitutionality of punishment is not
intended to minimize the significance of the countless informal, nonjudicial contacts defendants
have with the criminal justice system. Police officers, prosecutors, probation officers, and parole
board members can affect a defendant's ultimate disposition, sometimes as much or more than
judges and juries. These individuals, like sentencing judges, also operate under some assump-
tions concerning the purposes criminal punishment is supposed to serve. E.g., Morris, Foreword
to CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135, at vii. Whether articulated or not, these
beliefs-which may range from the most "enlightened" of rehabilitation theory to unadorned
retributivism-inevitably color innumerable day-to-day decisions about who should be arrested,
brought to trial, and committed to a nonpenal treatment program. Id.; see Dawson, TheDecision
To Grant or Deny Parole:A Study of Parole Criteria in Lawand Practice, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 243;
Goldstein, Police Discretion: The Ideal Versus the Real, 23 PuB. ADM. REV. 140 (1963); LaFave,
The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law (pt. 1), 1962 Wis. L. REV. 104; Note, Prosecutor's
Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057 (1955). See generally Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in
the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962). Any adjustment in the
conceptual structure we use to determine the appropriateness of punishment required by the
advent of organic treatment will thus have an impact at many levels of functioning of our system
of criminal justice.
229. E.g., S. BENN & R. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES ANDTHE DEMOCRATIC STATE 18,173-85
(1959); H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 11.
230. E.g., H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 11-16.
231. See generally Hawkins, Punishment and Moral Responsibility, 7 MOD. L. REV. 205
(1944). See also H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 9-13.
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punishment models.232 The goals themselves may well vary from case to
case, and from one type of offense to another.233 Nonetheless, the interests
underlying the classificatory schemes appear as variants of the four classic
principles-deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and protection of the
public.234 The following discussion reviews each of these traditional
rationales in light of organic treatment. Throughout, an attempt is made to
distinguish two polar cases: that of the individual whose criminogenic organic
substrate has been narrowly excised and that of the individual whose
treatment has produced broad-based personality changes along with removal
of the offending behavioral trait or propensity.
A. THE DETERRENCE INTEREST AND THE NEW MAN
Deterrence has long been considered a fundamental justification for the
criminal sanction. 235 Criminal laws are passed to denounce actions that we
find intolerable. This denunciation is made credible when those who break the
law are punished. The fear instilled in potential lawbreakers by the knowledge
that the guilty suffer for their misdeeds is believed to deter them from
committing similar offenses. Society is thereby protected from further harm.
This deterrent effect is meant to operate on two categories of individuals,
those who have committed crimes, and members of society at large. The
former effect is sometimes termed "specific deterrence";236 the latter,
"general deterrence. ' 237
In cases of organic rehabilitation, the continued applicability of both
specific and general deterrence is in doubt. Specific deterrence seems
particularly eroded. Since this type of deterrence rests on a prediction that
confinement will reduce the offender's propensity to repeat a criminal act,
once that propensity has been removed, the reason for continued punishment
232. E.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 2-13 (1968); H. PACKER, supra
note 135, at 9-13.
233. Morris, Foreword to CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135, at vii.
234. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965).
235. E.g., Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640,648 (9th Cir. 1957). SeegenerallyAndenaes,
The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966).
236. Specific deterrence consists of after-the-fact inhibition of the person punished. Gen-
eral deterrence, by contrast, is inhibition in advance by the threat of punishment. Specific
deterrence rests on the assumption that the individual will avoid future conduct which is likely to
subject him to imprisonment again. See L. ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 186
(1973).
237. General deterrence was first discussed, in modern times at least, by Bentham. J.
BENTHAM, Principles of Penal Law, pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 6, in WORKS 399 (J. Bowling ed. 1962). The
concept has received continual criticism. E.g., Sellin, Death and Imprisonment as Deterrents to
Murder, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 274 (H. Bedau ed. 1964). The doctrine, however, has
been revitalized by Andenaes. See Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?, 43 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 176 (1952).
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ceases. 2 8 The relationship between organic rehabilitation and general deter-
rence, however, is more complex. The early release of once-violent offenders
could be seen as rewarding them for their behavior. The public will to resist
the temptation to commit like offenses could thereby be weakened.
A number of considerations militate against this conclusion, however.
First, the therapy itself, even if self-imposed, might be seen as a form of
punishment most persons would choose to avoid. 239 This would appear to be
especially true in the case of the more radical therapies, like psychosurgery,
that can produce wide-ranging changes in character and personality. The
transformation of identity that can accompany such treatments would be seen
by many as a kind of death in which individual X1 ceases to exist and
individual X2 is created in his place. 2'0 This attitude might be as effective as
the threat of punishment in deterring potential lawbreakers.
A second consideration derives from a modification of the deterrence
theory. Many critics have pointed out that the deterrence rationale would, in
principle, justify punishing an innocent man if potential offenders could be
thereby deterred. To avoid this result, modern proponents of deterrence have
added the requirement that the individual punished must be chosen from
among the guilty. 241 Where personality modification has been severe this
condition may be unfulfilled, since the posttreatment individual's identity
differs from that of the individual who committed the crime.242 In other areas
238. Other reasons might, of course, remain intact. See discussion of other justifications for
criminal punishment discussed at notes 262-313 and accompanying text infra. See generally
Shepherd, Prison Rehabilitation: A Proposalfora Legally Enforceable Treatment Contract, I J.
CONTEMP. L: 201 (1975).
239. Compare Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right To Refuse
"Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REV. 155,157-58 (1975), with Legislating Control, supra note 1, at 292
n. 188 (suggesting that a frequent base of horror is the theft of the self, the fear that one's identity
is in danger of being stolen).
240. E.g., Legislating Control, supra note i, at 337 n. 338; cases cited notes 88 supra, 244
infra.
241. E.g., H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 62-70. There may be other limits to what may be
done in the name of deterrence. In Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968), the Supreme
Court held race segregation in prison unconstitutional unless demonstrably necessary for prison
security. The Court might have sought to justify the practice by reference to the principle of
deterrence. That it did not do so suggests that the more highly protected personal interests cannot
be violated in the interest of deterring others from criminality. If prisons may not justify racial
discrimination in order to promote deterrence, it seems reasonable to suppose that prisons may
not confine an organically rehabilitated prisoner in order to accomplish the same end; both
practices seem equally offensive to basic notions of human dignity and worth.
242. Compare note I supra (William Brindle's appeal), with notes 122-25 and accompanying
text supra (radical personality alterations following organic treatment). See also J. DELOADO,
supra note 4, at 214 (discussing identity alteration); Editorial, On the Legal Control of
Psychosurgery, 157 J. NERvous & MENTAL DISORDERS 151, 151-52 (1973) (characterizing
extensive brain operations as tantamount to identity change, since the brain is the organ most
closely identified with the human "self"); Brown, Wienckowski & Bivens, Psychosurgery:
Perspective on a Current Issue 2 (NIMH 1973) (describing the effect of some psychosurgical
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the law has recognized changes in legal status resulting from changes that
occur naturally. 243 Thus, it is hardly unreasonable also to recognize the
changes that take place suddenly as the result of deliberate technological
intervention. 244 Accordingly, when the changes in the rehabilitated offender
are great, it may well appear that further punishment for the sake of deterrence
is inappropriate because it violates the principle that innocent persons should
not be punished merely to discourage others.
Where the treatment has only affected a single neurological or
behavioral trait, 245 the case for deterrence is somewhat stronger. The claimant
retains the basic personality structure he had before treatment. He acts and
speaks as he did before and has the same set of memories. He has merely lost
his propensity to commit certain violent crimes. Arguably, such an individual
retains enough of his previous identity to justify punishing him in order to
deter others.
246
Although general deterrence may remain intact conceptually, some,
practical difficulties undermine its vitality, even in cases of inmates who have
operations as changing destructive, hyperactive individuals "into placid 'housekeeper[s]' by
psychosurgery"). For a discussion of the psychological and philosophical foundations of the
concept of personal identity, and some of the implications of identity changes, see Comment, The
Limits of State Intervention: Personal Identity and Ultra-Risky Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 826 (1976).
In reality, an abstract, metaphysical inquiry into the nature of human essence and identity is
probably unnecessary to resolve the question at issue in release decisions. Such decisions only
require that a determination be made whether a given individual X2 is sufficiently unlike
individual X (pretreatment) to warrant treating him differently. With general deterrence this
amounts to a determination of whether X and X2 are sufficiently alike that punishing X2 for the
crimes of X will deter potential offenders. Presumably, this is a fact question capable of
empirical determination.
243. See e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973) (fetuses attaining viability);
Workman v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374, 377-78 (Ky. 1968) (juveniles attaining age of
majority). See also In reGault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); State v. Hadley, 65 Utah 109,234 P. 940(1925)
(aged person declining into senile dementia).
244. Compare State v. Murphy, 156 Wash. 2d 761, 355 P.2d 323 (1960), with People v.
Bicknell, No. 102329 (SanJose, Cal., Mun. Ct., June 21, 1976). In Murphy the defendant obtained
a new trial on the grounds that he had testified while under the influence of powerful psychoac-
tive drugs administered by prison officials immediately before his trial. He convinced the court
that the drug had so altered his appearance and demeanor that the jury had been exposed to
someone other than his true self. In Bicknell a criminal defendant was acquitted following
testimony, given under hypnosis, showing that he suffered from a split personality. Using the
"testimony" of two alter egos against a third, evil alter ego, it was shown that the crime had been
committed by evil "Johnnie," who had since been purged by psychiatric treatment. The trial was
evidently the first in Anglo-American history in which a plea of split identity resulted in an
acquittal.
245. For a discussion of the narrowness of the effects of various treatment modalities, see
text accompanying notes 67-101 (chemical treatment), 107-16 (fractional psychosurgery) supra.
246. This of course supposes that other theories of punishment are ignored. At this point in
the analysis, it is still possible that an individual whose punishment makes no sense in terms of
deterrence might justifiably be punished in order to serve some other value, e.g., retribution.
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undergone narrow modification. One difficulty lies in calculating sentence
length. While the concept of deterrence tells us that certain individuals should
be punished, it says little about the severity of such punishment.24 7 To resolve
this theoretical difficulty, most advocates of deterrence turn to the principle of
utility: since punishment is an evil, it should continue no longer than
necessary to produce the needed level of deterrence.2 4 8 In the case of narrowly
modified individuals, the duration of punishment so measured may approach
zero. If the public knows that the offender has undergone treatment and no
longer poses a danger to society, punishment may lose its exemplary effect.
Indeed, punishment could have negative utilitarian value if it discouraged
persons in need of treatment from seeking it. Why undergo organic personal-
ity change if so doing could have no possible effect on one's sentence?
249
Consideration of the types of offenses for which organic therapy is likely
to be sought yields a further reason for doubting the deterrent value of
punishing rehabilitated offenders. Andenaes has observed that the deterrent
effect of punishment depends, in large part, on the type of offense. 250 In
criminal acts that are mala in se, the law supports an existing moral revulsion;
even if the legal sanction were withdrawn, public opinion would continue to
condemn them. 5 1 In contrast, acts that are mala prohibita are condemned
only because they are illegal.25 2 Thus, if it became possible to "cure" tax
evasion by a simple, painless operation, society might decide not to release
organically rehabilitated tax offenders to avoid weakening an already tenuous
norm. On the other hand, society might decide to release a fully rehabilitated
sex offender; he poses less of a risk to the vitality of the norm against sex
offenses since there already exists a strong community attitude disapproving
such behavior. In general, the more rational and normally motivated the
conduct, the greater the need for the criminal sanction. 253 Since acts of
senseless violence by individuals suffering from organic pathology are not
acts normal persons are likely to desire to emulate, shortening the sentence of
247. Evidence of this can be gained from observing that, as an empirical matter, the
relationship between sentence length and deterrence is complex. Long sentences do not always
deter better than shortones. SeeAndenaes, The GeneralPreventive Effects ofPunishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REV. 949, 964-70 (1966).
248. See, e.g., Battle v. Norton, 365 F. Supp. 925, 931 (D. Conn. 1973) (parole board can
refuse to grant parole in cases where early release would depreciate the seriousness of the offense
in the eyes of the public, i.e., where general deterrence might be harmed); S. BENN & R. PETERS,
SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 181, 186-94 (1959).
249. See generally Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right To Refuse
"'Rehabilitation, "61 VA. L. REV. 155, 157-58 (1975) (discussing the deterrent effects of making
organic treatment a compelled procedure).
250. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV, 949,
957-58 (1966).
251. Id. at 957.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 958.
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small numbers of such individuals is not likely to encourage such lawless
behavior.
In summary, it appears that specific deterrence offers no support for
prolonging the confinement of organically rehabilitated individuals. General
deterrence remains valid only if the therapy itself is not seen as constituting an
adequate punishment, and even then only in cases where personality change is
not so great as to change the identity of the individual. In both classes of cases
practical sentencing considerations vitiate the need for further punishment.
B. REHABILITATION
Many of the same considerations that militate against the deterrence rationale
operate to attenuate the rehabilitative principle as well. The rehabilitation
theory can be summarized as involving the beliefs that:
(1) Human behavior is the product of antecedent causes;
(2) These causes can be identified with scientific precision;
(3) Measures can be taken to treat these causes so that the undesirable
behavior is eliminated; and
(4) This enterprise-sometimes called the "therapeutic state' '-is the
only defensible reason for incarcerating human beings in a civilized
society.2
5 4
The proponents of rehabilitation theory tend to see criminality as a
sickness, over which the criminal has no more control than a person suffering
from headache or fever. 5 5 Inflicting punishment on such persons is itself a
crime 2 6 comparable to flogging victims for having contracted influenza or
suffered a broken limb. Criminality has not been viewed this way until
recently because medical science had not been able to cure it.257 But now that
physicians have learned to alter the psychological and physical bases of much
criminal behavior,2 8 refusal to accept the rehabilitative ideal is as irrational as
the resistance, two centuries ago, to treating insanity as a form of illness.5
9
Before the rehabilitative ideal can be accepted, its proponents argue, correc-
tional institutions will need to adopt a "therapeutic attitude" and cease
treating criminals as objects of hatred and scorn. 26° Suffering and deprivation
should cease to be regarded as inevitable accompaniments of prison life.
254. Alien, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 226 (1959). See generally H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENTAND RESPONSIBILITY 158-210 (1968); H.
PACKER, supra note 135, at 9-71.
255. E.g., K. MENNINGER, THE CUME OF PUNISHMENT 254 (1968).
256. See generally id.
257. Id. at 255-58.
258. Id. at 258; notes 36-182 and accompanying text supra.
259. K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 258 (1968).
260. Id. at 262.
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Although the infliction of punishment may have some slight utility in the case
of certain hardened offenders, who may need to have demonstrated to them
the futility of their way of life,261 suffering should not be imposed for its own
sake.
Although this view has not escaped criticism, 262 the rehabilitation
position is consistent with a long developmental trend in American penologi-
cal thinking 263 and appears unlikely to diminish in importance in the near
future. Indeed, prison reformers have recently begun to press for acceptance
of rehabilitation as a constitutional or statutory right of the confined. 64
Regardless whether rehabilitation should be accepted as the preeminent
principle its advocates urge, the question remains whether rehabilitation can
justify continued punishment for new men. Since the objective of rehabilita-
tion is to produce an individual whose propensity to violate societal norms has
been reduced to acceptable levels, once this reduction has been brought about
there would appear to remain no further need for confinement. As in the case
of deterrence, additional incarceration could frustrate the rehabilitative objec-
tive by exposing the prisoner to corrupting influences and by causing
resentment at being punished even though he is no longer a threat to
society. 2
65
Some commentators, however, have disputed the propriety of describ-
ing as "rehabilitated" persons whose reformation has been effected by
physical means. Rehabilitation, they argue, requires that the offender
demonstrate a capacity for self-reform and self-restraint.2 66 The organically
reformed man has demonstrated neither; he has simply been placed in a
physical condition in which he is unable to break the law. 267 Such reconstitu-
261. See McCorkle & Korn, Resocialization Within Walls, 295 ANNALS 88, 96-97 (1964).
262. E.g., Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 226 (1959); Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the
Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 296 (1974); Stender, The Need to Abolish "Corrections," 14 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 793 (1974).
263. E.g., Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit The Harm, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 297, 304-15 (1974). See generally AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASS'N MANUAL OF
CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 10-20 (3d ed. 1966); Right to Rehabilitation, supra note 7.
264. E.g., Right to Rehabilitation, supra note 7; Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment
for Prisoners: Society's Right of Self Defense, 50 NEB. L. REV. 543, 545 (1971).
265. For a description of some of the shameful conditions existing in our penal institutions,
see Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF
PUNISHMENT 28-89 (1968).
266. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616,657-58 (1972); cf. Shapiro,
The Uses of Behavior i7ontrol Technologies: A Response, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, vol. 7, Fall
1972, at 55, 59-63 (nonvolitional conforming behavior is not praiseworthy).
267. See Shapiro, The Uses of Behavior Control Technologies: A Response, ISSUES IN
CRIMINOLOGY, vol. 7, Fall 1972, at 55, 60.
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tion is, at best, morally neutral-the prisoner can neither be praised nor
blamed for it.268 The moral status of such persons is thus different from that of
prisoners who, having repented their misdeeds, voluntarily embark on
programs designed to make them into better persons.
There are two possible responses to this argument. First, when organic
treatment is undertaken at the prisoner's initiative, the changes brought about
become morally significant and may be taken as evidence of his reformation.
Second, the argument, to the extent that it is persuasive, rests on an
equivocation between means and ends or between processes and goals. Such
confusion is invited by the two meanings of rehabilitation, which can refer
both to cures and to treatments. When courts scrutinize prison action that
encroaches on fundamental liberties of inmates, they are ordinarily concerned
with the action's relationship to ends, not means. Expressed differently, they
look to its tendency to promote certain objectives of the criminal justice
system, rather than the action's possible characterization as one of a variety of
acceptable means. When it is seen that the term "rehabilitation" refers
ambiguously to both ends and means, the problem vanishes. Penal systems
can no more rationally refuse to release an inmate who is reformed and
otherwise entitled to release simply because he has undergone rehabilitation
of one type rather than another, than they can deny release to a convict who
has served his full sentence on the grounds that he spent his entire time in a
state of self-induced trance.
269
C. RETRIBUTION
The retributive rationale has been formulated in a variety of ways. Common
to these is the assertion that punishment is justified not because of some future
gain expected to result from inflicting it but because of the historical fact that
268. See Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used To "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 655-58 (1972); Shapiro,
The Uses of Behavior Control Technologies: A Response, ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY, Fall 1972, at
55, 62.
269. A refusal to recognize as rehabilitated those individuals whose cure has been effected
by organic means, like denial of release to the prisoner who spends his days in a state of trance,
may well reflect a concern deriving from another basis-retributivism. Because such a prisoner's
"rehabilitation" has been made so easy, he has not yet fully paid his debt to society. Until this
debt is paid, his readiness for release (his "rehabilitation") is incomplete. Intuitive feelings that
evildoers must atone for their sins remain unsatisfied; no showing that the offender is now
harmless will satisfy these feelings. Whether this objection makes sense is considered more fully
in the next Section. When addressed strictly in rehabilitative terms, however, this objection
appears to offer little support for refusing to recognize as reformed individuals who have
undergone organic therapy which has demonstrably reduced their potential for violence to
normal levels. Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?"
"Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616,658 & n.210 (1972). But cf.
H. PACKER, supra note 135, at 57-58 (autonomy problems pose a further objection to rehabilita-
tion as a primary goal of punishment).
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an offense has been committed.27° The earliest known formulation is the Old
Testament lex talionis: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. 271 Because the
offender has taken what is not his, something of his must be taken in return.
Aristotle and Aquinas were retributivists, as was Kant, whose Philosophy of
Law declares that "[p]unishment . . . must in all cases be imposed only
because the individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime. "272
Some commentators have sought to temper the retributive demand with
an admixture of moral and humanitarian concerns, often reflecting a preoccu-
pation with the prisoner's reformation. Fyodor Dostoyevsky wrote that
criminal punishment is as much a matter of moral insight as of impersonal
justice, since the offender becomes morally rehabilitated through the experi-
ence of deprivation and suffering. 273 Others, however, resist any attempt to
combine retributive with nonretributive justifications, arguing that this
dilutes the moral basis of the retributivist position. Sir Walter Moberly, for
example, writes that retributivists reject the notion that punishment should be
inflicted for utilitarian reasons such as deterrence or reformation. Such
punishment degrades the victim since it treats him as a means rather than an
end in himself.
274
Modern courts have given retribution, however defined, a mixed recep-
tion. Several opinions frown on retribution as an expression of bloodlust, 27 5
while others, including Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Furman v.
Georgia, find the retributive instinct an indispensable expression of moral
feeling.
276
Since, in its classic formulation, retribution is essentially retrospective,
it might appear to offir an unassailable justification for continuing to punish
rehabilitated offenders. If the only reason for inflicting punishment is a past
event-the prisoner's crime-it is difficult to see how a subsequent event-
his alleged rehabilitation-can affect the retributive rightness of his sentence.
Still, such punishment, even granting the retributivist premise, can be
attacked on a number of grounds.
270. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152 (1939). See also A. EWING, THE MORALITY OF
PUNISHMENT 13 (1929).
271. Exodus 21:23-25; see 4W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *12.
272. I. KANT, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie transl. 1974 ed.) (emphasis in original).
273. Chapter introduction, Retribution, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135, at
40 (discussing Dostoyevsky's and Kant's notions of retributive punishment). See also Pope Pius
XII, Crime and Punishment, 6 CATH. LAW. 92, 97-100, 108-09 (1960).
274. W. MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 109-10, 117 (1968).
275. See Commonwealth v. Ritter, 13 Pa. D. & C. 285,290-91 (1930); cf. Williams'v. New
York, 337 U.S. 241,248 (1949) (retribution no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law).
276. 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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First, many retributive theorists believe that moral condemnation by the
community is central to retributive punishment. 277 Such punishment ex-
presses and gives tangible form to our sense of moral outrage at persons who
have violated our laws. 278 Punishing offenders solidifies societal consensus in
moral matters and strengthens the general will to obey the law.
279
To the extent that moral outrage is central to retributivism, this basis for
punishment may be undermined when technological advances make outrage
an inappropriate response. Anger might seem less appropriate when the
physical basis of the criminal behavior is known, making the behavior
proportionately less free.2 80 Moral outrage might also appear inappropriate
once the offender has been demonstrably rehabilitated. If moral outrage
requires a present target, as opposed to a past one, the reason for outrage
disappears when the target changes and is no longer present. It is perhaps
conceptually possible to imagine outrage directed at individual X2, because of
his connection with individual X1, but the more these individuals differ with
respect to their blame-making predicates, the more the retributive instinct
becomes blurred and loses its intuitive appeal. 281 Retribution requires an
identity between the person punished and the individual who committed the
offense. "[A] criminal cannot substitute another to undergo his punish-
ment" ;282 unlike money debts these are moral debts that can only be paid by
the criminal himself. But just as the moral instinct becomes attenuated when
the target individual differs from the person who committed the crime, the
277. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. Simpson transl. 1933);
Hart, The Aims of Criminal Law, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 404-05 (1958). See also
STANDARDS & GOALS, supra note 141, at 145.
278. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring); E.
DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. Simpson transl. 1933).
279. E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 108-09 (G. Simpson transl. 1933).
280. For example, sleepwalkers are no longer punished. Fox, Physical Disorder, Conscious-
ness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 645,652-56 (1963); see Fain v. Commonwealth,
78 Ky. 183 (1879); Bradley v. State, 277 S.W. 147 (Tex. Crim. 1925); MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Nor are epileptics condemned for actions carried out during
seizures. E.g., People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 146, 138 N.E.2d 799, 807, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558,570
(1956) (Desmond, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The language we use to describe such
individuals betrays our feeling that their acts are blameless. We speak of them as not "being
themselves." When they "return to their senses," they feel "regret," rather than "remorse." In
the same fashion, moral outrage could seem inappropriate when the offense is the product of a
treatable chemical imbalance, see notes 15-22,67-101 and accompanying text supra, neurological
anomaly, see notes 116-26 and accompanying text supra, or other physical disorder, particularly
when the resulting violent impulse is irresistible. See discussion at noes 28-35 supra.
281. Compare W. MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 116 (1968) ("my misdeed is not
only something which has happened to me like a misfortune or a disease. . . I did it and I chose to
do it .... "), with sources cited note 280 supra.
282. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 318 (2d ed. 1947); see Flew, The
Justification of Punishment, 29 PHILOSOPHY 291, 293-94 (1954).
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required identity between offender and the recipient of punishment becomes
indistinct when the original offender has undergone organic treatment result-
ing in extensive personality change. 83 If we punish because there is a debt to
be paid,2 84 when the person owing the debt is no longer present, the debt may
simply become uncollectible.
285
A final difficulty in applying the retributive rationale to new men lies in
determining the appropriate degree of punishment. Most retributivist writers
have rejected the notion that offenders must be made to suffer in proportion to
the suffering they have caused. 28 6 Instead, they urge only that punishment not
283. In actuality, it should not be necessary to show that the offender is a different person
from the one who committed the crime. Most formulations of the retributivist position only
require that there be a close connection, not a complete identity, between the individual selected
for punishment and the person adjudged guilty. For example, they state punishment is a
deprivation of good and an imposition of evil intimately applied to an offender because of his
commission of a harm forbidden by penal law. Pope Pius XII, Crime and Punishment, 6 CATH.
LAW. 92, 94 (1960). There must be an essential causal connection between the person punished
and the crime. Id. Where such a connection is lacking, punishment is retributively inappropriate.
In practice it should be a great deal easier to show that the requisite nexus has been broken than
that one is an entirely different individual from the one who committed the crime. One effect of
such a conclusion is to make release claims predicated on an absence of retributive justification
open to individuals who have undergone narrow modification as well as those who maintain
therapy has given them a new identity.
284. CompareW. MOBERLY, THE ETHICS OF PUNISHMENT 109-10(1968), with Pope Pius XII,
Crime and Punishment, 6 CATH. LAW. 92 (1960) (criminal owes a spiritual debt).
285. Cf. text accompanying notes 235-53 supra (discussion of identity modification and
deterrence). Unlike the earlier inquiry, the issue here is a conceptual, not an empirical one: When
is X, who has committed a crime, sufficiently unlike X2 , an organically altered individual, to
warrant suspension of the retributive principle? No court has ruled on such an issue, although it
apparently entered into William Brindle's appeal, for the simple reason that until now it has not
been possible to certify organic change with the requisite degree of reliability. Thus, parole and
other release proceedings have been considered highly discretionary, and courts have been
reluctant to overturn the findings 6f such boards in the absence of gross abuse of discretion. This
rule is appropriate in most instances; after all,'iittle is known about the spiritual and moral forces
at work in nonorganic rehabilitation. This is an area governed by intuition and feeling, rather than
hard data.
The present problem, however, is a different one. Demonstrable change has occurred. The
issue is whether the quantum of change is sufficient to warrant a finding that a "new man" is
present. If so, is retributive punishment appropriate? In the absence of guidelines for determining
legal identity, such cases will be decided on a case-by-case basis. This is not to say that precedent
is totally lacking. See note 251 and accompanying text supra (discussion of situations involving
legally recognized identity modification). To cite but one example, juveniles are treated as
differentiable legal entities from the adults they will become. This is based on a policy decision
that juveniles have the potential for change and growth. As one starting point, then, a court could
ask whether the difference between X and X2 is of the same order of magnitude as that
commonly observed in a typical individual as he passes from adolescence to adulthood.
Naturally, the quantum of change required would vary with the interests prompting the inquiry.
We might decide to hold X2 responsible for X's debts, for example, but not his crimes. This
would reflect a feeling that criminal retribution requires a high degree of identity between X, and
X 2 , while commercial necessity might dictate a different result.
286. Walker, Varieties of Retributivism, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135, at
83, 83, 85. But see Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152-54 (1939) (criticizing other retributiv-
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be "excessive.' '287 Concepts of excessiveness, or proportionality, become
elusive, however, when blame-making propensities become mutable at will.
What was a retributively just sentence at the time of its imposition might
appear excessive in light of later events, in particular the prisoner's organic
transformation. If a retributivist looks only to the past, insisting that future
events cannot alter a sentence that was just when imposed, then, of course, his
position cannot be assailed on these grounds. In such a case, the only recourse
would seem to lie in persuading him that the person being punished is not the
one whose past contains the blame-making event, or, less paradoxically, that
the two individuals are insufficiently alike to warrant continued punishment.
In summary, the retributive rationale seems greatly, perhaps fatally,
eroded in cases of organic rehabilitation. At most, it would appear to justify
brief sentences responsive to the community's need for vengeance. The need
for even such short sentences may well disappear when the organic bases of
certain types of criminal acts become better known.
D. SOCIETAL PROTECTION
A final rationale is societal protection, the notion that society is justified in
confining criminals in order to prevent them from causing further harm. This
rationale is essentially predictive: the criminal is punished not for what he has
done, but for what he might do . 288 It is assumed that one bad act is likely to be
followed by another. An individual who has been dangerous in the past is
likely to be dangerous in the future.
289
Societal protection appears to play an important role in sentencing
decisions, particularly in cases involving violent crime.29° Persons who have
acted violently in the past, and are thus regarded likely to repeat the offense in
the future, are apt to be "sent away" for long prison terms. 291 In contrast,
individuals who have no history of violent offenses or whose actions appear to
have been the product of unique circumstances unlikely to be repeated are apt
to be treated more leniently.2 92 The interest in societal protection has been
ists for succumbing to the temptation to admit nonretributive principles into the sentencing
determination).
287. Walker, Varieties ofRetributivism, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135, at
83.
288. E.g., H. PACKER, supra note 136, at 49.
289. Id. at 49-50; see N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONESTPOLITICIAN'S GUIDETO CRIME
CONTROL, 185-92 (1970).
290. E.g., Chapter introduction, Social Defense, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra
note 135, at 129-30; seeNATIONAL COUNCILON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDESTO SENTENCING
THE DANGEROUS OFFENDER 1-5 (1969).
291. Chapter introduction, Social Defense, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT, supra note 135,
at 130; see SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134, at 291-92.
292. N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDETO CRIME CONTROL 203
(1970); SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134, at 301-08.
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cited with approval by a number of courts 293 and has been recognized in
several model statutes. 29' Typically, these record the importance of a determi-
nation of dangerousness 295 and stress the need for psychiatric reports,
neurological workups, and other evidence prior to imposing sentence.
296
Can societal protection justify the continued incarceration of individuals
who have undergone organic rehabilitation? Since such individuals have been
treated and certified as having a probability of recidivism below a level agreed
to be safe, 297 the interest in societal protection is at best, marginally furthered
by continued confinement. Whether the defendant's safety becomes known at
the time of trial or after the sentence is begun to be served is immaterial; in
either case confinement contributes little to societal safety.
It might be urged that the new man, having already violated the law,
should be held to a higher standard than mere safety. This demand would be
misconceived, however. Insofar as it reflects a feeling that evildoers should
redeem themselves by traversing a difficult path, it responds more appro-
priately to the retributive impulse. 291 Insofar as it expresses a concern that
moral values will decline if offenders go free too easily, it is more properly
addressed to general deterrence. 299 And, to the extent that it seeks to assure
public safety by building in a margin for error, it misconceives the nature of
the certification process, by its very nature probabilistic °.3 °
In terms of societal protection, the appropriate sentence for the organi-
cally rehabilitated inmate is no sentence at all; societal protection has already
been achieved. Admittedly, most sentencing decisions are not made on social
protection grounds alone; they respond, rather, to a mix of motives. In cases
of violent crime, the sentence generally has two components-time to be
293. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965); Berrigan v. Norton, 322 F.
Supp. 46, 51 (D. Conn. 1971).
294. MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 2.1-2.2
& Commentary (Approved Draft 1968); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
MODEL SENTENCING ACT §§ 5-6 (1963).
295. E.g., STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, at 145.
296. E.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 6,
(1963); see NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, GUIDES TO SENTENCING THE
DANGEROUS OFFENDER 4-8 (1969).
297. The point at which such certification can be made, as a matter of scientific judgment,
would vary from one modality to another. Compare note 90 and accompanying text supra, with
notes 98-101 and accompanying text supra and note 35 infra. Such linedrawing decisions are not
purely technological ones, since they inevitably involve normative components, viz., "At what
point should we accept a rehabilitated individual into society?" The point at which risk is seen as
acceptable will presumably depend on the theory or theories used to justify punishment. See
notes 228-34 supra.
298. See notes 270-88 and accompanying text supra.
299. See note 237 and accompanying text supra.
300. See note 133.
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served because of what the defendant has done, and time to be served as
protective detention against what he might do in the future.30 1 When the
prisoner has been freed of his violent propensities, the second component
would drop out. The appropriate sentence would then depend on the extent to
which the retributive principle is applicable to organically reformed offen-
ders. This, in turn, would rest on factors considered earlier, 30 2 principally the
effect of identity change on the retributive principle. 30 3 In itself, however,
societal protection offers scant support for the continued confinement of new
men.
IV. THE RELEASE DECISION: REMEDIES FOR
UNJUST CONFINEMENT
Remedies for the organically rehabilitated prisoner who desires to challenge
his confinement include appellate review of sentence, 304 motions to reduce
sentence, 30 5 state and federal habeas corpus and their statutory equivalents, 
306
pardon and commutation of sentence, 30 7 parole, 30 8 and a variety of statutory
postconviction remedies. 3°9 There is considerable duplication and overlap-
ping among the various procedures, 3 10 as well as uncertainty over the extent
of due process protections available at various stages of the proceedings.
3 11
None of the existing remedies is ideally suited to hearing challenges
based on organic reformation. Some have restrictive limitations on the time of
filing. 3 11 Others are highly discretionary, or impose an unreasonably heavy
301. E.g.,Silving, "Rule ofLaw "in CriminalJustice, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE 77 (G.
Mueller ed. 1961) (discussing the dual-track system in comparative perspective).
302. Notes 270-85 and accompanying text supra.
303. See notes 280-85 and accompanying text supra.
304. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-196 (West Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 924.41
(West Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278 §§ 28 to 28D (1972); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW§
460.10 (McKinney 1971).
305. Under the common law, courts had the power to modify sentences if they acted within
the term in which sentence was passed. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); see United
States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347 (1928). E.g., DEL. SUP. Cr. R. (CRIM.) 35(b) (Supp. 1975); FLA.
STAT. ANN. (R. CRIM. PRoc.) 3.800 (1975); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (setting various times for
sentence reduction).
306. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 3; 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1474-1508 (West 1970).
307. E.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 ("he [the President] shall have the Power to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for offenses against the United States except in Cases of Impeach-
ment."); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 4852.01-.21 (West 1970).
308. Since the mid-1930's, every state and the federal system has had some form of parole.
For a state-by-state discussion of parole structures, see W. O'LEARY & J. NUFFIELD, THE
ORGANIZATION OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1972).
309. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2001 to 2027 (1956); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.42
(1972); ORE: REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680 (1963).
310. ABA PROJECt ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO POST-CONViCTION REMEDIES § 1.1, Commentary, at 24 (Approved Draft 1968).
311. Id. at 65, 75, 76.
312. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2-year limitation on motion for new trial on newly
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burden of proof on the petitioner. 313 Still others have jurisdictional 314 or
evidentiary restrictions3 15 that limit their helpfulness. Although most of the
traditional remedies could probably be stretched to accommodate cases of
organic rehabilitation, a new, more flexible remedy would avoid the need for
tortured interpretation. Alternatively, some of the model postconviction
statutes that have been proposed by law reform bodies3 16 and adopted by a
minority of jurisdictions 317 seem capable of being extended to deal adequately
with the release issues posed by new men.
A. FRAMING THE ISSUES-THE PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR RELIEF
The new man who seeks release must first establish that he has undergone the
necessary degree of change. Then, he must show that this change invalidates
the bases for his incarceration.
Proof of rehabilitation can be carried out by offering medical evidence
that the prisoner's dangerous tendencies have been alleviated and are unlikely
to return. If the offender is no longer dangerous but requires additional
treatment or observation to ensure that his symptoms will not recur, he will
need to convince the court that, if released, he will make himself available for
the necessary treatment or examination.
The inmate will then need to persuade the court that the change he has
undergone invalidates the bases upon which his sentence was predicated.
318 If
discovered evidence); FLA. STAT. ANN. (R. CRIM. PROC.) 3.800(b) (1975) (time limitations on
motion to reduce sentence); Wyo. STAT. § 7-408.1 (Supp. 1975) (5-year limitation on statutory
postconviction remedy).
313. See Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254, 257, 56 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1944)
(much-cited statement of the absolute nature of the parole board's discretionary powers in
determining release dates). Pardon and commutation of sentences are considered matters of
executive "grace." See SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 140, at 1127, 1217.
314. E.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 434-36
(1963) (exhaustion requirement in federal habeas corpus); United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347
(1928); State exrel. Zabel v. Municipal Court, 179 Wis. 195, 190 N.W. 121 (1922) (sentencing court
loses power to modify sentence once defendant has been delivered to the institution).
315. See ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT
ING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 4.6 (Approved Draft 1968).
316. E.g., id.; UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT (1955); see ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF
SENTENCES (Approved Draft 1968).
317. See N. KERPER & J. KERPER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE CONVICTED 243-44 (1974).
318. Often this will not require a separate inquiry, as a number of the techniques include
response testing as an integral part of the treatment. E.g., notes 89-90 and accompanying text
supra (chemical treatment for sex offenders). Where predictable results are less easily attained
and relapse is possible, see notes 123-32 and accompanying text supra (discussion of
psychosurgery), a court might reasonably require the prisoner to submit to an extended period of
observation and testing before ordering release. For a general discussion of the success-
certifiability problem, see note 133 supra.
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the prisoner is only seeking to prove that his violent propensity has been
narrowly treated, this showing will center around general deterrence and
retribution.3 19 When the sentencing record is inconclusive, the inmate may be
limited to arguing that these interests are disfavored in sentencing policy
generally or have been disapproved by statute or court decision in his
jurisdiction. 320 In a jurisdiction which provides minimum sentences, he may
argue that the minimum term represents the state's interest in retribution;
321 if
he has already served the minimum term, he can then argue that the interest in
retribution has been satisfied. On the other hand, if the inmate succeeds in
proving that his modification has amounted to an identity change, this second
step will not be necessary, since this degree of change renders inapplicable all
possible bases of confinement.322
B. THE APPROPRIATE FORUM
Decisions concerning the release of an organically rehabilitated inmate
should be made by the court that imposed the original sentence, rather than
some other body. The sentencing court is in the best position to know the
relative weight of the various factors that entered into the original sentence
and to evaluate the extent to which these may have been satisfied by the
prisoner's rehabilitation. The record of the original proceedings will be found
there, as well as the presentence report.323 If it becomes necessary to recall
319. See text accompanying notes 235-53, 270-88 supra.
320. Deterrence has been criticized as an inadequate basis for punishment since the fear of
sanction rarely deters potential offenders. Retribution has been characterized as an anachronistic
expression of the instinct for tribal vengeance and as inconsistent with the goal of rehabilitation.
E.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); G. PLAYFAIR & D. SINGTON, CRIME,
PUNISHMENT AND CURE 13-15 (1965); Chapter introductions, in CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT,
supra note 135, at 39-40, 93-95. State constitutions, statutes, or enabling legislation relating to
particular criminal institutions may refer to rehabilitation as the principal aim of confinement,
.thereby implicitly excluding deterrence and retribution. E.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 18 ("The penal
code shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not of vindictive justice."); MONT.
CONT. art. III, § 24 ("Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of
reformation and prevention."); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2002, 2032 (West 1970) (rehabilita-
tion is primary purpose of penal institutions); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-10-1 (1965) (setting out
purpose of a particular penal program). Courts have cited these and similar statutes in striking
down institutional programs that were not conducive to the advancement of statutorily defined
objectives. E.g., Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1966); United States v.
Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973, 979-81 (D.D.C. 1971). See also S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTIONS 740 (2d ed. 1973); Comment, A Statutory Right to Treatment for Prisoners:
Society's Right to Self Defense, 50 NEB. L. REV. 543 (1971). Seetext accompanying notes 332-34
infra (proposed procedure when the sentencing record is incomplete).
321. Cf. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 2.2, 2.5 (Approved Draft 1968) (suggest-
ing that a minimum sentence might be necessary in certain cases in response to the "gravity" of
the offense).
322. See notes 241-46 and accompanying text supra.
323 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§ 4.1-4.5 (Approved Draft 1968).
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witnesses, these will be more conveniently available in the original court than
elsewhere. To protect against the possibility of prejudice arising because the
site of review and that of the original sentencing are the same, change of
venue can be provided for and made liberally available.
C. PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Many release procedures require that the inmate file for relief within a given
period after sentence is imposed. 324 Others require that the inmate first serve a
fixed minimum term or portion of his sentence before the remedy is avail-
able. 325 These limitations, which may make sense in other contexts, are less
easily justified in cases of organic rehabilitation. Organic therapy may be
administered at any point in the prisoner's sentence. When it is successful, the
justification for further punishment may cease. Accordingly, it seems best to
make release available whenever the inmate can show that physical correction
of an organic anomaly has dissipated the original grounds of his commitment.
D. DEFERENCE To BE ACCORDED PRIOR JUDGMENTS
Many release procedures have traditionally been held to be highly discretion-
ary.326 Parole board determinations, for example, have rarely been over-
turned on substantive grounds. 327 These decisions have been considered to
fall in an area of intuitive judgment, in which the board's experience justifies
deference toward its decisions. 328 Where rehabilitation is no longer a matter
of intuition, but becomes susceptible to objective proof, the need for judicial
deference is less compelling. Accordingly, courts should not be reluctant to
entertain facially meritorious claims of organic rehabilitation when the
prisoner has been or will soon be reviewed for release by his parole board or
adult authority.
E. BURDEN OF PROOF
Similar considerations argue for a reduction in the burden of proof inmates
must bear to win release. In the past, prisoners have been required to make an
almost overwhelming showing that their sentences were illegal before courts
would intervene. Because of the presumption of regularity that attends
judicial proceedings, it has been presumed that the initial conviction was
correct and that the inmate is serving an appropriate sentence.3 29 As has been
324. See note 312 and accompanying text supra.
325. 4 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 4 (1939).
326. See note 313 and accompanying text supra.
327. E.g., Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 293 N.Y. 254,257-58,56 N.E.2d 572,573=74 (I944).
328. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1970); MODEL PENAL
CODE § 305.14, Comment at 98 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
329. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).
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seen, however, organic treatment can at times undermine the latter assump-
tion, with the result that an inmate may find himself serving a sentence that
was correct at the time of its imposition but that has ceased to be appropriate.
Although a degree of skepticism is perhaps always warranted with respect to
release claims, 330 courts should not impose unreasonably high standards of
proof simply because release has rarely been ordered in the past or for fear of
provoking a flood of applications.
An argument can be made for reversing the usual burden of proof and
imposing a presumption in favor of release in certain cases. 331 Instances might
arise in which prison officials have induced inmates to undergo treatment by
overstating the likelihood of success. Suppose such an inmate agrees to the
therapy and afterwards feels better and believes his violent impulses have
been greatly moderated. Suppose, further, that the parole board refuses to
release him on the sole grounds that it does not believe him and feels he has
not "done enough time." In an action for relief, it might be a fairer allocation
of the burden of proof to require the government to prove that the therapy has
not been successful rather than to require the inmate to prove the converse. By
encouraging the prisoner to undergo treatment the government implies it
believes the treatment will prove successful. Having relied on that representa-
tion, the inmate should be entitled to the benefit of the assumption that the
government told him the truth. One salutary effect of this shift in the burden of
proof would be to encourage prison officials to be properly cautious about
overselling therapies that are still unproven or experimental.
F. PRESUMPTIVE INAPPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN RATIONALES
WHEN THE SENTENCING RECORD Is INCOMPLETE
Cases may arise in which the sentencing court has made no record, or an
330. Caution is an appropriate response since a release right, like other legal defenses and
excuses, can inject uncertainty into the criminal law, reducing its in terrorem effect. Cf. H.
PACKER, supra note 135, at 64 (excuses are an important source of uncertainty). Moreover,
lenient treatment of offenders can encourage self-help and vigilante justice. E.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J. concurring). Finally, indulgent treatment of
offenders who do not merit it invites attack on the entire principle of releasing organically
rehabilitated inmates. Cf. Bailey, An Evaluation of One Hundred Studies of Correctional
Outcome, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND CORRECTION 733,736-39 (2d ed. N. Johnston,
L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1970) (discussion of current disenchantment with other treatment);
Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning, and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse "Rehabilitation," 61
VA. L. REv. 155, 158-60 (1975). See also Grinker, Emerging Concepts of Mental Illness and
Models of Treatment: The Medical Point of Viev, 125 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 865,866(1969);Yalom
& Lieberman. A Study of Encounter Group Casualties, 25 ARCH. GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 16
(1971).
331. Cf. STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, Standard 12.3, Commentary at 423 (placing
burden in sentencing on state to prove that an individual is not an appropriate candidate for
release).
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inadequate record, of its reasons for imposing a given sentence.33 2 In these
cases, unless the reasons can be reconstructed in some fashion, the inmate
will be at a considerable disadvantage in showing that the state has no
legitimate interest in his continued confinement. The absence of a record
means that he will have to demonstrate the inapplicability of every possible
sentencing rationale. Particularly in the case of retribution this may prove a
formidable task, since retribution could theoretically play a part in every
sentencing decision.
333
One solution would be to permit an inference that unless the record
explicitly refers to a given interest, that interest has not actively entered into
the decision to incarcerate the individual. The release of a convicted felon
may appear an extreme penalty for a court's failure to record its reasons for a
given sentence. But, to the rehabilitated inmate, delay in obtaining his liberty
after he has ceased to be a menace to society is an even harsher penalty. Since
the articulation of reasons for sentencing has been urged by commentators,
commissions, and law reform bodies, 334 it seems fair to place the burden of
justification on the state. Accordingly, an organically reformed inmate should
be entitled to a presumption that unknown and unrecorded interests have not
been used to justify his confinement.
G. FRAMING THE RELIEF
Many postconviction remedies are limited in the forms of relief they offer.
Depending on the remedy the inmate selects, relief can range from outright335
or conditional 336 release to a simple reduction of sentence. 337 The civil
disabilities that attend successful prosecution of each remedy also vary. 338
Because the proposed remedy contemplates that the postconviction review
332. In passing sentence, judges commonly consider the classic rationales of criminal
punishment. E.g., id. at 142. They apply them to the particular offender in light of their
knowledge of his crime and the information about him developed in the presentence report. See
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
REVIEW OF SENTENCES § 4.4 (Approved Draft 1968). At times, however, courts have neglected to
articulate these reasons for the benefit of the record. STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, at
147, 195-96.
333. See, e.g., Puchalski v. Vukcevich, 2 Prison L. Rep. 27, 29 (D.N.J. 1972) (parole board
able to conclude, in the absence of any statement in the record to the contrary, that an inmate's
sentence responded to "punitive," Le., retributive, elements-parole accordingly denied).
334. E.g., STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, Standard 5.19, at 195; cf. McCleary v.
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W. 2d 512 (1971) (sentence reversed because trial judge failed to give
reasons why he imposed a given sentence). See also STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141,
Standard 5.19, Commentary, at 951.
335. SINGER & STATSKY, supra note 134, at 1217 (executive clemency).
336. Id. at 1059-93 (parole release conditions).
337. See notes 304-05 and accompanying text supra (appellate review and motion to reduce
sentence).
338. See SINGER & STATSKY supra note 134, at 1095-134 (collateral effects of conviction).
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function as an extension of the sentencing process, 339 it seems advisable to
permit the court to select any of the sentencing alternatives that are open at the
time of trial. For organically reformed prisoners, these could include outright
discharge, release on the condition that the individual submit to periodic
treatment or observation, or release at an early specified date. 34° It could
include an order that the prisoner undergo further observation and testing
while in prison, or that a postsentencing investigation be carried out to
ascertain the fitness of the inmate to reenter society and the ability of his
community and family to accept him and to assist him in his adjustment.
CONCLUSION
Progress in several biomedical technologies suggests that propensities for
certain types of acts now punishable under the criminal law are capable of
being modified or eliminated. Such therapies as electronic brain stimulation,
pharmacological treatment, and psychosurgery raise the possibility that a
number of assumptions integral to our concept of criminal justice will give
way, including that (1) the moral justification for punishment remains
constant during a prisoner's confinement; and (2) an offender's identity
remains unchanged throughout the same period. Any significant erosion of
these assumptions necessarily weakens the connection between punishment
and the traditional goals and objectives which punishment is supposed to
serve.
Insistence by courts on a close means-ends fit in prison law cases
involving the infringement of particular liberties, together with increased
willingness to scrutinize prison sentences themselves under such theories as
cruel and unusual punishment, therapeutic incarceration, and a more stringent
construction of legislative intent, suggests that such erosion may give birth to
a constitutional right to release. Presently existing channels are not ideally
suited to consider claims based on such a release right, and new remedies will
be needed. The contours of such a remedy have been sketched. It is proposed
that release be available as a matter of right, rather than discretion, once the
appropriate factual showing has been made. In order to protect against the
possibility of overreaching by prison officials and as a further protection of
the right to refuse treatment when consent has not been freely and knowingly
given, the right to release would be protected by certain procedural presump-
tions and inferences.
339. See text accompanying notes 323 supra.
340. Cf.STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 141, Standard 5.2 (1973) (nondangerous offen-
ders should be given the sentence alternatives that are the least drastic limitations on their
freedom, consistent with the public safety). Where the prisoner's rehabilitation is very uncertain
and release seems unwise, the inmate can be retained in the institution for anadditional period of
study and observation. During this time, a lighter disciplinary regime might well be appropriate,
as well as useful in gauging the extent of the individual's return to normalcy.
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Recognition of a release right for organically rehabilitated offenders is
consistent with the view that punishment should serve rehabilitative ends. At
the same time, it recognizes that punishment responds to interests other than
rehabilitation and accepts the necessity of determining, in each case, the
extent to which other interests militate for or against release. The need to
determine more precisely the weight to be assigned such nonrehabilitative
interests as general deterrence and retribution will call for greater attention by
courts and legislatures to these interests. This inquiry should be undertaken
soon. Although the number of cases which have raised issues of organic
rehabilitation has so far been relatively small, the inexorable advance and
dissemination of biotechnological techniques means that this inquiry cannot
be safely delayed much longer. Unless such questions are to be resolved
haphazardly as they arise, it is better that they be considered now while the
law relating to organic rehabilitation is relatively unformed and has not
hardened into a fixed pattern.
